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Introduction 
On the one hand, the popular success of the British author Graham Greene (1904–91) has 
been very considerable. One indication of the continuing interest in Greene’s work is the two 
fine films based on his work that have appeared recently, Neil Jordan’s The End of the Affair 
(1999) and Philip Noyce’s The Quiet American (2002). On the other hand, critical interest in 
Greene’s fiction has been variable, David Lodge’s brief work Graham Greene (1960) 
remaining one of the best on the subject. In the introduction to his book Graham Greene 
(1999), Robert Hoskins provides a useful survey of some of the more important critical works 
that have appeared. Works on Greene’s late fiction, such as The Human Factor (1978), 
Doctor Fischer of Geneva (1980), and Monsignor Quixote (1982), are notably quite scarce. 
Some critics may perhaps be repelled by Greene’s popular success, and even by the fact that 
he is not considered a post-modern writer, while another explanation is that it may simply 
take some time to achieve the necessary critical distance to the subject. It may also be that 
Greene’s late fiction tends to disrupt some of the patterns and phases that critics had already 
identified, by returning more explicitly to religious and philosophical themes. To some they 
may even seem somehow less weighty than the author’s earlier work; Grahame Smith, for 
instance, dismisses Doctor Fischer of Geneva and Monsignor Quixote as ‘chamber works 
compared with The Honorary Consul and The Human Factor’ (195), and consequently does 
not feel any need to discuss them. This thesis, however, aims to show The Human Factor, 
Doctor Fischer of Geneva, and Monsignor Quixote in a rather different light, as works that 
complement each other, both returning to earlier themes in Greene’s fiction and developing 
these into new insights, particularly in the light of the work of the Basque philosopher, 
professor of Greek, and rector-for-life of the University of Salamanca, Miguel de Unamuno 
(1864–1936). 
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The year 2004 marks the centenary of the birth of Graham Greene. The author’s long 
life from 1904 to 1991 spans the greater part of the 20th century and his fiction arguably 
provides some of the most vivid literary reflections of those troubled years. Like many authors 
of his generation, Greene had a conventional middle-class background. He was educated at 
Berkhamsted School, a venerable but minor public school in Northamptonshire where his 
father became the headmaster, and at Balliol College, Oxford, where he took a second in 
Modern History. While at Oxford Greene met and fell in love with his future wife, Vivien, 
who was a Roman Catholic convert. Graham Greene was himself received into the Roman 
Catholic Church in 1926, before their marriage and before seriously embarking on his career 
as an author. The couple separated after the Second World War, but the marriage was never 
dissolved. Vivien Greene died in 2003. 
An indefatigable, indeed compulsive traveller, Greene witnessed numerous wars and 
conflicts in person, as well as the great social and political upheavals of his time, something 
which certainly had a major impact on his fiction. Most notable for his novels, Greene’s large 
literary output spans six decades: his first novel was published in 1929 and his last in 1988. 
Greene’s life until 1955 is described in great detail by Norman Sherry, his official biographer, 
in two volumes; it has been announced that a long-expected third volume will be published 
this year to coincide with the centenary. A more immediate insight into Greene’s life and 
thinking can be gained from his essays, and from his two slim volumes of autobiography, A 
Sort of Life (1971) and Ways of Escape (1980). Greene never received the Nobel Prize for 
Literature, something which does not seem to have upset him greatly. 
One of the most striking characteristics of Graham Greene’s fiction is its compelling 
physical and religious landscape. Greene’s travels are reflected in his fiction to such an extent 
that Mark Lawson thinks ‘His novels can be seen as the most brilliant postcards ever written’ 
(5). This element in Greene’s fiction can be expected to have a continued appeal to readers for 
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many years to come. Greene also took a lifelong interest in philosophy and theology, and 
many of his novels deal with religious themes which in some cases are central to the plot. For 
instance, as Lawson points out, ‘The question of whether Scobie in The Heart of the Matter 
killed himself only matters because the novel assumes that he has gone to God’s judgment’ 
(4). Yet, with the apparent decline of organised religion in recent decades, at least in much of 
Europe, Greene’s novels may come to be seen as increasingly dated, and some of the concepts 
involved may seem increasingly hard to grasp. 
Even so, it is important to remember that until very recently, a symbiotic relationship 
existed between art and religion, as can be seen in innumerable works of architecture, 
literature, music, painting, and sculpture, great and small, on all continents and in every 
religious tradition. This, it seems, represents a fundamental aspect of human experience. The 
study of the relationship between art and religion, then, may well afford important insights 
into both the world of art and the world of religion. 
In light of all this, what is the place of Catholicism, as the religion Greene personally 
preferred, in The Human Factor (1978), Doctor Fischer of Geneva or the Bomb Party (1980), 
and Monsignor Quixote (1982)? What, if anything, binds these novels together, despite their 
very considerable differences in form? How do they relate to the large corpus of Greene’s 
earlier fiction and to the philosophy of Unamuno? And what kind of Catholicism is 
represented in Greene’s novels? While each of Greene’s novels contains an autonomous 
world of fiction that establishes and obeys its own distinctive laws, at the same time the 
novels clearly reflect the overarching concerns and interests of the author. Greene’s art cannot 
be seen as isolated from history, philosophy, politics, or religion, but rather engages with 
them in a broad, catholic dialogue. The critical approach of this thesis, perhaps not unlike the 
approach taken by the Journal of Literature and Theology, is therefore to be equally inclusive, 
in particular with regard to the fields of philosophy and theology. 
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Chapter One: Greene and Unamuno 
1. 
I say, from the nature of the case, if Literature is to be made a study of human nature, you cannot 
have a Christian Literature. It is a contradiction in terms to attempt a sinless Literature of sinful 
man. You may gather together something very great and high, something higher than any 
Literature ever was; and when you have done so, you will find that it is not Literature at all. 
(Newman 195) 
It has been quite common in discussions of the fiction of Graham Greene to attempt to 
identify certain phases of his development as an author. This is hardly surprising, considering 
the great span of Greene’s literary career, and given the natural tendency of literary critics 
towards dividing literature into periods and phases. But this division into phases also seems to 
reflect critics’ changing perceptions of Greene’s fiction, as may be seen from a brief survey of 
some of Greene’s works. In the early 1930s Greene was seen mainly as a writer of thrillers 
and entertainments, such as Stamboul Train (1932) and A Gun for Sale (1936). This 
perception changed with the publication of Brighton Rock (1938), which, while retaining the 
structure and atmosphere of the thriller, dealt explicitly with serious issues of Catholic 
morality. Greene’s exploration of Catholic themes continues and intensifies in The Power and 
the Glory (1940), The Heart of the Matter (1948), and The End of the Affair (1951), quickly 
leading to a notion of Greene as a so-called Catholic novelist. Yet novels such as The Quiet 
American (1955), Our Man in Havana (1958), and The Comedians (1966) undermined this 
critical perception, as Greene seemed to abandon explicitly Catholic themes for the morality 
of international politics, as seen in his treatment in these three novels of the French colonial 
war and early American involvement in Indochina, the brutality of Batista’s Cuba, and the 
horror of ‘Papa Doc’ Duvalier’s Haiti, respectively. In view of this change, Greene was 
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increasingly seen as a humanist rather than as a Catholic novelist. In between these political 
novels, Greene also wrote A Burnt-out Case (1960), set in the Belgian Congo on the verge of 
independence, yet dealing with the highly existential, personal problems of Querry, an 
architect who feels misrepresented and misunderstood by those who would see him as 
essentially a Christian artist. The Honorary Consul (1973) juxtaposes politics and religion, 
dealing with a renegade Catholic priest who unsuccessfully attempts to kidnap the U.S. 
Ambassador to Argentina in protest against Stroessner’s dictatorship in neighbouring 
Paraguay. The Human Factor (1978), though ostensibly a return to the spy-thriller genre, 
deals mainly with the themes of personal loyalty and responsibility in relation to – and in 
conflict with – individual happiness. The short novel Doctor Fischer of Geneva or the Bomb 
Party (1980) stands out as a chilling study of apparently unmotivated evil. Finally, Greene’s 
Manchegan novel, Monsignor Quixote (1982), chronicles the remarkable growth of friendship 
and love between two disparate travelling companions, the humble parish priest and the 
communist ex-Mayor of El Toboso. This work, an extraordinary dialogue between 
Catholicism and communism, self-consciously draws both on Miguel de Cervantes’ early 
17th-century account of the adventures of Don Quixote and Sancho, and on the works of 
Miguel de Unamuno. 
Graham Holderness disagrees with the received critical perception – ‘the dominant 
critical problematic’ – that would identify a specifically Catholic period in Greene’s fiction. 
This approach he summarises as follows: 
Greene underwent conversion to Catholicism through a combination of ulterior motive and 
intellectual curiosity. His conversion introduced him to a dogmatic and sectarian religious faith 
which produced some stridently ‘Catholic’ novels; but Catholicism only temporarily arrested his 
eventual assumption into a non-sectarian universal humanism. As he drifted away from any 
specifically doctrinal loyalty, so his fiction ceased to dwell on Catholic themes and adopted as its 
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moral territory a wider, more inclusive world: the secular and existential world of alienated 20th-
century man. (261) 
Indeed, a considerable problem with this approach is the fact that throughout his career as a 
novelist Greene remained committed – at least intellectually – to Catholicism, so that there is 
hardly a single novel by Greene that is not somehow permeated by Catholic faith and morals. 
How, then, are the notions of the Catholic novelist and Catholic fiction best to be understood 
with regard to Greene? As Frank Kermode has pointed out in his critical essay ‘Mr Greene’s 
Eggs and Crosses’ (1961), the bedside tale of the misunderstood jeweller in A Burnt-out Case 
not only fits Querry the architect, but also Greene the novelist. Certainly Greene objected to 
being classified as a Catholic novelist, saying that ‘Many times since Brighton Rock I have 
been forced to declare myself not a Catholic writer but a writer who happens to be a Catholic’ 
(qtd in Couto 32). Yet Greene’s objection to this label does not diminish the centrality of 
Catholicism to a reading of his fiction. Greene approves of Cardinal Newman’s observation 
that the notion of a Christian – or Catholic – literature, ‘a sinless Literature of sinful man’, is a 
‘contradiction in terms’, in fact ‘that it is not Literature at all’ (195). According to Cardinal 
Newman, literature ‘is the Life and Remains of natural man, innocent or guilty’ (194), and 
this surely is what Greene’s fiction represents throughout, as manifested in such diverse 
characters as Raven, Pinkie, the ‘whisky priest’, Scobie, Querry, and a great many more. It is 
possible that what truly characterises Greene’s fiction is neither Catholicism nor humanism as 
such, but a form of Catholic realism – or Catholic engagement with the human factor – that is 
as serious about the moral and religious dimension of life as it is about the social and political 
one. To Greene, no diagnosis of the human condition in the 20th century can be wholly 
realistic without taking into account the experience of faith. 
Greene emphasises the formative influence of childhood on later life, and in particular 
the lasting impact made by books read in childhood. In an important essay, ‘The Lost 
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Childhood’ (1947), Greene reflects on the effect of Marjorie Bowen’s The Viper of Milan, an 
historical novel about Gian Galeazzo Visconti, Duke of Milan, which he had read at the age 
of about fourteen: 
I think it was Miss Bowen’s apparent zest that made me want to write. One could not read her 
without believing that to write was to live and to enjoy, and before one had discovered one’s 
mistake it was too late – the first book one does enjoy. Anyway she had given me my pattern – 
religion might later explain it to me in other terms, but the pattern was already there – perfect evil 
walking the world where perfect good can never walk again, and only the pendulum ensures that 
after all in the end justice is done. (17) 
What Greene here suggests is that his fundamental view of life and literature was shaped 
while he was still a schoolboy at Berkhamsted, and that this produced a determining pattern 
for his later work. Religion does not alter or modify this original pattern, but may be seen as a 
framework which helps to make sense of – and express – lived experience. It is not a system 
that arbitrarily imposes itself contrary to earlier experience, but one that recognises and builds 
on that experience. As David Lodge perceptively points out: 
There is a good deal of evidence, internal and external, that in Greene’s fiction Catholicism is not a 
body of belief requiring exposition and demanding categorical assent or dissent, but a system of 
concepts, a source of situations, and a reservoir of symbols with which he can order and dramatize 
certain intuitions about the nature of human experience – intuitions which were gained prior to and 
independently of his formal adoption of the Catholic faith. Regarded in this light, Greene’s 
Catholicism may be seen not as a crippling burden on his artistic freedom, but as a positive artistic 
asset. (6) 
Greene’s Catholicism, however, is more than a series of empty symbols to be filled with 
secular meanings, as Lodge seems to suggest; it is rather something that permeates his fiction 
at a moral level right from the start. 
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Thus, there is a sense of evolution rather than of discontinuity in Greene’s conversion 
to Catholicism. Too much emphasis on distinct phases will tend to obscure this insight. There 
is really no room for a distinctively Catholic phase in Greene’s fiction since Catholicism may 
be better perceived, in Lodge’s words, as an overarching ‘system of concepts, a source of 
situations, and a reservoir of symbols’ (6). Greene himself indirectly supports this 
interpretation when he says that ‘What I disliked in some Catholic criticism of my work […] 
is the confusion between the functions of a novelist and the functions of a moral teacher or a 
theologian’ (Ways of Escape 256). Greene’s fiction, then, is Catholic in the sense that it is 
informed by Catholic concepts and symbols, thus turning Catholicism into what Lodge calls 
‘a positive artistic asset’ (6); his fiction is not moral theology in disguise, in which case it 
might possibly be, as Cardinal Newman says, ‘something very great and high,’ yet ultimately 
‘not Literature at all’ (195). 
Another critical approach has been the attempt to identify recurring themes in 
Greene’s fiction, sometimes in the form of certain major obsessions. Though both valid and 
valuable, this, however, hardly constitutes the kind of overall pattern already mentioned, a 
pattern that would seem to be more in the nature of a philosophical system than one of literary 
tropes. Such tropes merely serve to express in literary form the overall philosophy, the pattern 
that might be explained in other terms by religion. Thus, with the apophthegmatic expression 
‘perfect evil walking the world where perfect good can never walk again’ (‘The Lost 
Childhood’ 17), Greene seems to be referring quite specifically to Satan (‘perfect evil’) and 
Jesus (‘perfect good’) as understood in traditional Catholic dogma. The birth of Jesus is an 
event that has taken place once and for all, whereas Satan seems to be continuously 
reappearing in ever new forms and guises. Somewhat more obscurely, Greene suggests in the 
same passage that ‘only the pendulum ensures that after all in the end justice is done’. The 
image of the pendulum seems to imply that in the end justice must prevail, in a way that is 
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both mechanical and subject to the forces of nature. Yet this should not be seen as a final 
statement of the pattern of Greene’s fiction, rather as one of many attempts at expressing it. 
The terms in which this is done may be seen as characteristic of Greene’s writing, 
particularly the sparse, metaphorical, apophthegmatic style. Having once been lured into 
believing that life as an author would be enjoyable and fulfilling, writing apparently became 
something of a necessity and a passion to Greene: ‘before one had discovered one’s mistake it 
was too late’ (‘The Lost Childhood’ 17). To him, writing was therapeutic, so that he would 
sometimes ‘wonder how all those who do not write, compose or paint can manage to escape 
the madness, the melancholia, the panic fear which is inherent in the human situation’ (Ways 
of Escape 275). Greene’s fiction, then, is the result of the author’s life-long search for new 
ways of escape, which frequently takes both author and reader into strange new territory. 
There is nothing static about this search; it continuously takes on fascinating new forms, yet it 
remains the same search, the same ‘pattern’. 
Frank Kermode notes in ‘Mr Greene’s Eggs and Crosses’ that some of Greene’s work 
has been criticised for being ‘sometimes flawed by the author’s inability to stand clear of his 
hero or victim’ (180). Indeed, the critic attempting to write about Greene’s fiction may also 
from time to time run the risk of confusing the author with some of his characters. Certainly, 
for the critic attempting to describe something of the evolving pattern of Greene’s fiction 
there may be even more of a temptation to read the fiction as spiritual autobiography in 
disguise. Yet Greene suggests that to yield to this temptation would be a mistake: 
‘Undoubtedly if there is any realism in the character it must come from the author 
experiencing some of the same moods as Querry, but surely not with the same intensity’ 
(Ways of Escape 256). The fiction may be distilled from the author’s experience, but it is still 
fiction, not autobiography. 
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If one accepts that Greene’s fiction is more than elaborate allegories of moral theology, 
more than a system of recurring authorial obsessions, and more than thinly veiled fragments 
of autobiography, what, then, is it? If Cardinal Newman is right in saying that ‘you cannot 
have a Christian Literature’ and that ‘It is a contradiction in terms to attempt a sinless 
Literature of sinful man’ (195), it is nevertheless also true to say with Lodge that Greene’s 
Catholicism may be seen as ‘a positive artistic asset’ that provides the author with ‘a system 
of concepts, a source of situations, and a reservoir of symbols’ (6). 
In fact, Lodge’s criticism from 1966 seems no less true in the light of Greene’s later 
fiction, including the thoughtful spy-thriller The Human Factor (1978), the menacing short 
novel Doctor Fischer of Geneva (1980), and the Manchegan novel Monsignor Quixote (1982). 
In a way, these three works can be seen as the culmination of Greene’s literary career, each in 
its way expressing different facets of the author’s artistic concerns. As such, they pursue a 
number of themes that have been of great importance in Greene’s earlier fiction, but not 
without some new and unexpected relocations. Thus, even though Maurice and Sarah Castle 
in The Human Factor share an African past, the novel is firmly set in Maurice’s London office 
and his suburban home in Berkhamsted; Jones and Anna-Luise’s marriage, though tragically 
brief, is a very happy one; and in the Manchegan novel there is a wonderful sense of comedy 
and an emerging optimism about the possibility of love, hope, and even faith – the three last 
things in Christian theology. 
Before looking more closely at The Human Factor, Doctor Fischer of Geneva, and 
Monsignor Quixote, however, it will be useful to introduce some elements of the philosophy 
of Unamuno. While it may perhaps be wrong to suggest that Unamuno influenced Greene 
directly, this thesis aims to show that there is a great deal of philosophical affinity between the 
two men, and that reading Greene in the light of Unamuno can provide valuable critical 
insights. In particular, Unamuno’s discussion of the relationship between doubt and faith, and 
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his notion of ‘the tragic sense of life’, will be of great value for a reading of Greene’s late 
fiction. As a critical practice, this parallel reading will allow the critic to see Greene’s novels 
not just as isolated works, but as contributions to a wider philosophical and religious dialogue. 
2. 
If you desire faith – then you’ve faith enough. 
(Browning, ‘Bishop Blougram’s Apology’ 634) 
Just as Graham Greene may be said to have expressed something of the human condition in 
the 20th century in his works of fiction, so may Miguel de Unamuno (1864–1936) be said to 
have done, in other terms, in his main philosophical work, The Tragic Sense of Life in Men 
and Nations (1913). According to The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Unamuno’s ‘aim 
was to capture life in its complex emotional and intellectual dimensions rather than to 
describe the world scientifically. Thus he favored fiction as a medium for his ideas and may 
be considered a precursor of existentialism’. Furthermore, 
Unamuno perceived a tragic sense permeating human life, a sense arising from the certainty of 
death. In this predicament man must abandon all pretense of rationalism and embrace faith. Faith 
characterizes the authentic life, while reason leads to despair, but faith can never completely 
displace reason. Torn between the two, we can find hope only in faith; for reason deals only with 
abstractions, while we are ‘flesh and bones’ and can find fulfillment only through commitment to 
an ideal. (938) 
Unamuno does not reject reason, but rather insists on the limitation of reason and the 
separation of faith and scientific rationality. He therefore distances himself from Augustine’s 
dicta fides praecedit rationem (‘faith precedes reason’) and credo ut intelligam (‘I believe in 
order to understand’) which, while indicating the priority of faith over reason, seem to portray 
faith as primarily a means of achieving understanding. Instead, Unamuno embraces the 
paradoxical view expressed by Tertullian in his sayings et sepultus resurrexit, certum est, quia 
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impossibile est (‘he was buried and rose again, it is certain because it is impossible’) and 
credo quia absurdum (‘I believe because it is absurd’) (4: 82). Believing, not in order to 
understand, but because it is absurd, then, is the key to Unamuno’s metaphysics, and he warns 
against the ‘terrible danger’ inherent in ‘attempting to believe with one’s reason rather than 
with one’s life’ (4: 86). Attempting to believe with one’s reason constitutes not simply a 
philosophical error but a practical impossibility, and those who do attempt it are eventually 
driven to despair and even to atheism: according to Unamuno ‘those who deny God deny Him 
out of despair at not finding Him’ (4: 202). Similarly, Unamuno dismisses the ‘classic 
supposed proofs of God’, which he claims ‘all refer to this God-Idea, to this logical God, this 
God by elimination, and hence they really prove nothing, or rather, they prove no more than 
the existence of this idea of God’ (4: 176). This leaves only blind faith in the invisible God, 
and so Unamuno repeatedly stresses that ‘To believe in God is, in the first place […], to wish 
for God to exist and to be unable to live without Him’ (4: 185). 
Unamuno sees faith as a basic existential need arising from ‘the longing not to die, the 
hunger for personal immortality, the striving to persevere indefinitely in our own being’ (4: 
42), which he identifies within himself; he cannot and will not believe that physical death is 
the end to his own conscious existence as a human being. Yet reason does not support the 
notion of a life beyond physical death. On the contrary, reason alone, according to Unamuno, 
leads inevitably to ‘vital negation’, the denial of eternal life. Reason thus clashes with the 
existential need for immortality, and from this clash between reason and desire arises ‘vital 
scepticism’, which questions the validity of the rational denial of immortality. This in turn 
leads to doubt or uncertainty, which to Unamuno is ‘the supreme consolation’ (4: 131). 
Unamuno cannot prove the existence of life after death, but his own longing for immortality 
leads him for the moment to disregard rationality and assert that ‘We attain to the living God, 
the human God, not through reason, but only through love and suffering. Reason rather 
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separates us from Him’ (4: 184). Unamuno disarmingly describes himself as leading his 
readers ‘on into a region of phantasy, but phantasy not devoid of reason – for nothing subsists 
without reason – phantasy founded on sensibility. And as regards the truth of it all, true truth, 
truth independent of ourselves, beyond our logical and cardiacal truth, as regards that truth – 
¿quién sabe?’ (4: 145). This final question – ‘who knows?’ – is fundamental to an 
understanding of Unamuno’s thought. What he proposes may or may not be true; Unamuno 
quite simply wishes – that is, believes – it to be true. He illustrates his point (4: 133) with the 
words of the father of the epileptic or possessed boy in the Gospel according to Mark: ‘Lord, I 
believe; help thou mine unbelief’ (9.24). Unamuno is clearly attracted to the paradoxical 
nature of this exclamation, which elsewhere he paraphrases as ‘Lord, I believe; give me the 
something to believe in!’ (4: 219). To Unamuno, then, faith is the offspring of doubt. Yet 
Unamuno explicitly distances himself from Descartes’ methodical or theoretical doubt: ‘The 
doubt I mean is a passionate doubt, the eternal conflict between reason and feeling, between 
science and life, between the logical and the biotic’ (4: 120). The only thing Unamuno does 
not doubt is his own existence, the existence of his aggressively insistent yo (‘I’), as Salvador 
de Madariaga points out in his introductory essay to The Tragic Sense of Life, ‘Unamuno Re-
read’; and all Unamuno’s efforts in that volume are driven by his desire for the immortality of 
this yo, a desire that must lead him to doubt any argument against his own immortality. Doubt 
or uncertainty, then, is not only inherent in the human condition; it is a necessity for human 
life: ‘How, without this uncertainty, could we ever live?’ (4: 131). 
As Anthony Kerrigan points out in the Translator’s Foreword to The Tragic Sense of 
Life, Unamuno writes in a letter to the novelist Leopoldo Alas: ‘My faith in an intimate, 
organic Catholicism, wellspring of reflex actions, is precisely what turns me against it when it 
is concretized in formulas and concepts’ (4: ix).This seems to be a product of Unamuno’s 
insistence on the separation of faith and reason. He prefers faith expressed in action to faith 
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expressed in writing. Yet it is a curious paradox that Unamuno’s life was primarily 
intellectual. As Madariaga puts it, his ‘life was all within’ (Unamuno 4: xxxvii), and much of 
the content of his philosophical works borders on theological speculation. Yet what Unamuno 
opposes is not theology as such, but rather a particular kind of theology that sets out neat 
definitions and formulae in paragraphs, sections, and subsections, contained perhaps in 
pocketsize handbooks of moral theology. Unamuno prefers paradox to definition, and equally 
resists the encroachment of scientific rationalism on the domain of theology, as exemplified 
by those so-called theologians who would like nothing better than to reduce the figure of Jesus 
to a rather nice but minor political figure in a remote part of the Roman Empire, some of 
whose ideas on social justice they may still be prepared to offer a cursory glance. 
The human desire for knowledge and truth clashes with the obstinate persistence of 
doubt, just as rationality clashes with the human desire for eternal life. Unamuno’s philosophy 
may seem to represent a curious sort of ‘half-belief’ (Monsignor Quixote 111), an unworthy 
resignation in the face of doubt which perhaps could be conquered by an even stronger faith. 
Nothing could be further from the truth; instead there is a dogged stubbornness that 
characterises Unamuno’s faith – a faith which is the product of doubt and persists in the face 
of doubt. Faith, to Unamuno, is not a muddled feeling or a vague sensation, but a conscious 
act of will against every resistance. Nor is faith simply limited to a mental state, but is also a 
call to action: Unamuno insists that to ‘believe in God is to long for His existence, and 
furthermore, to act as if God did exist’ (4: 203). To some, this may smack of hypocrisy: how 
can one ‘act as if God did exist’ if one does not ‘really’ believe, that is, if one does not believe 
without a doubt? Yet it is not hypocritical to acknowledge one’s doubts; rather it may be 
unnecessary scruples that keep modern human beings from embracing faith in eternal life, as 
they feel their own faith to be insufficient in the face of scientific rationality. In his 
stubbornness, however, Unamuno is a true heir of the Spanish mystical tradition of the noche 
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obscura experienced by John of the Cross, the dark night of faith where God seems to be 
absent and only the will to believe remains. Thus, according to Unamuno, ‘perhaps the sin 
against the Holy Ghost, for which, according to the Gospel, there is no remission, is none 
other than that of not desiring God, that of not longing to be made eternal’ (4: 270–1); in other 
words the unpardonable sin is not to lack faith, but to lack the desire for faith, which to 
Unamuno is truly inhuman. 
In Unamuno’s thought there appears to be a fundamental, metaphysical assumption 
that faith cannot exist without doubt. His ontology seems to be based on binary oppositions: 
the divine and the human, faith and doubt, orthodoxy and heresy, happiness and suffering all 
exist in contrast or opposition one to the other. Yet having acknowledged these dichotomies, 
Unamuno immediately sets about blurring them again, to the extent that he can say, almost in 
one and the same breath, that God creates man, that man creates God, and that God creates 
Himself in and through man. His discussion of faith and doubt, for instance, suggests a 
symbiosis rather than an irreconcilable opposition. What he proposes may not exactly be that 
faith cannot exist without doubt – or God without man, orthodoxy without heresy, happiness 
without suffering – but rather that neither would have any meaning without the other. 
Unamuno’s reading was truly catholic, encompassing poetry and fiction as well as 
ancient and modern philosophy, perused mostly in the original languages. Above all, however, 
he was captivated by Miguel de Cervantes’ great novel Don Quixote (1605; 1615), in which 
he finds the perfect illustration of his own views on faith and uncertainty, doubt and reason. 
To Unamuno, ‘Don Quixote is the prototype of the vitalist whose faith is founded on 
uncertainty, and Sancho is the prototype of the rationalist who doubts his own reason’ (4: 
133). Unamuno goes on to explain that ‘rationalists seek definition and believe in the concept, 
while vitalists seek inspiration and believe in the person’ (4: 208). Unamuno thus emphasises 
once more what he sees as the equal uncertainty of rationalism and faith. Elsewhere (4: 125) 
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he quotes approvingly from Robert Browning’s poem ‘Bishop Blougram’s Apology’: ‘All we 
have gained, then, by our unbelief / Is a life of doubt diversified by faith / For one of faith 
diversified by doubt’ (209–211). That Unamuno should choose to quote these lines 
demonstrates not only the scope of his reading but also his liberal attitudes, as will become 
apparent. As will also be seen, this poem provides an interesting link between Greene and 
Unamuno, and for that reason too merits closer inspection. 
When ‘Bishop Blougram’s Apology’ appeared following the restoration of the 
Catholic hierarchy in England and Wales in 1850, it was widely regarded as a personal attack 
on Cardinal Nicholas Wiseman, the first Archbishop of Westminster. Blougram’s ‘apology’ – 
or defence – may be seen as scandalous for two reasons. The first is that ‘Sylvester Blougram, 
styled in partibus / Episcopus’ (972–3) privately reveals his rich enjoyment of the material 
comforts and social privileges of high ecclesiastical office; the second that he freely admits 
his own doubts. Combined, this gives the impression of cynicism or hypocrisy; if Blougram 
does not fully believe, how can he justify his luxurious life at the expense of the faithful? But 
Blougram, like Unamuno, argues that doubt is inseparable from faith: ‘I show you doubt, to 
prove that faith exists. / The more of doubt, the stronger faith, I say’ (602–3). In this, there is 
no particular reason to doubt Blougram’s conviction and sincerity, for in vino veritas – the 
‘truth that peeps / Over the glasses’ edge when dinner’s done’ (17–18). Blougram even injects 
a note of almost Unamunian fervour into his discourse when he describes himself as someone 
who not only wants, but is ‘made for, and must have a God’ (846) if life is to have any 
meaning at all. And the unbelief to which he refers is a hypothetical or methodical unbelief, 
designed to show that the unbeliever is no better off than the believer, and equally prone to 
uncertainty. Blougram, then, perhaps does not quite resemble the ideal or typical image of a 
good priest, but he has much of the vitalist in him, just as his counterpart, the ludicrously 
named Mr Gigadibs, comes out as something of a rationalist, though not, apparently, one who 
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he is ready to doubt his own reason: in disgust he emigrates to Australia. Blougram’s strength, 
however, lies in his intellectual openness and patent sincerity, and it is not difficult to see why 
he should appeal strongly to both Greene and Unamuno. 
Though Spanish Catholicism – like its British counterpart – has been closely 
associated with political conservatism, Unamuno is described as ‘seeking a synthesis of 
liberalism and religious faith’ (4: xlvi). He was undeterred by any anti-Catholic associations 
with regard to ‘Bishop Blougram’s Apology’; instead he was interested in Blougram’s 
philosophical arguments in their own right. Unamuno’s attitude seems to be that he will 
search for the truth everywhere, and he himself will be the judge of the standard of truth. A 
liberal individualist and a fervent, yet troubled believer, Unamuno strove for a rebirth of 
spiritual forces against rationalistic atheism. If anyone sees a contradiction in his project, 
Unamuno replies with Walt Whitman: ‘Do I contradict myself? Very well then, I contradict 
myself’ (4: xlv). Indeed, Unamuno is afraid neither of contradicting nor of repeating himself, 
and his work is as ‘organic’ as his Catholicism, a religion which he believes ‘oscillates 
between mysticism and rationalism’ (4: 85). 
3. 
Graham Greene explains that ‘I had not known Unamuno’s A Tragic Sense of Life when I 
wrote ‘A Visit to Morin’ or later A Burnt-out Case’ (Ways of Escape 258) in 1959 and 1960 
respectively. In Travels with My Aunt (1969) there are clear signs of Greene’s growing 
interest in Unamuno, and finally in Monsignor Quixote (1982) Unamuno’s philosophy 
definitely emerges as an element of major importance, as will be discussed in a later chapter. 
Other chapters will discuss the two novels immediately preceding the Manchegan novel, The 
Human Factor (1978) and Doctor Fischer of Geneva (1980), with a particular view to 
identifying points of contact between Greene’s fiction and Unamuno’s philosophy. Before 
coming to this, however, it may be useful to investigate further Greene’s role as what he 
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termed a writer who happens to be a Catholic, to explore in more detail the apparent affinity 
between Greene and Unamuno, and to discuss the difficult but necessary task of separating 
between Greene’s fiction and the author’s biography. 
Greene came to resent being stereotyped either as a Catholic writer or as any other 
kind of writer. In a dinner conversation published in the French Catholic journal Dieu Vivant, 
however, he states that ‘Quand on est catholique, il ne faut pas chercher à faire du 
“catholicisme”. Tout ce que l’on dit ou écrit respire inévitablement le catholicisme’* (‘Propos 
de table avec Graham Greene’ 136). As these lines so clearly demonstrate, Greene was also 
very much interested in the place of Catholicism in both life and literature. In the case of the 
short novel Loser Takes All (1955), for instance, Greene says he hoped to produce ‘something 
which neither my friends nor my enemies would expect. […] A reputation is like a death 
mask. I wanted to smash the mask’ (Ways of Escape 216). While it is true that Greene’s 
retrospective interpretation of his own actions and motives may be questioned, this still 
provides a valuable insight into the author’s thinking. In particular, it strengthens the 
impression of Greene’s unwillingness to conform to the expectations of others. Like many of 
his characters, such as Castle in The Human Factor, he seems to have an intense wish to 
define himself rather than to be defined by others. 
Tracing the various so-called periods of Greene’s work may be nothing more than a 
chronology of Greene’s attempts to break out of the stereotypes imposed on him by the critics. 
While this may be interesting enough in its own way, it fails to say anything about the world 
behind ‘the mask’. For behind the shifting forms of Greene’s fiction one may discern a 
remarkable continuity of techniques and themes. Greene himself refers to one simple 
technique, ‘isolating two characters – hiding in a railway shed in Stamboul Train, in an empty 
house in A Gun for Sale’ (Ways of Escape 29), which can also be seen at work in his later 
                                                 
*
 ‘When you are a Catholic you must not strive to perform “Catholicism”. Everything that you say or write will 
inevitably breathe Catholicism.’
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fiction; a steadily recurrent theme is escape or flight; and these two, escape and the isolation 
of two characters, appear in ever new combinations. Examples include the ‘whisky priest’ and 
the police lieutenant in The Power and the Glory; Castle and old Halliday on their way to the 
airport in The Human Factor; and the adventures of Monsignor Quixote and Sancho. What 
this technique provides is above all a privileged place for dialogue. 
Greene points out that, in fact, all his published work (except one immature book of 
poetry) was written after his conversion to the Roman Catholic Church – hence all his work is 
by a writer who happens to be a Catholic. To single out certain works as more or less 
‘Catholic’ is beside the point: Catholicism is the moral and philosophical paradigm that 
permeates all Greene’s fiction, however obliquely. A living and breathing Catholicism that 
permeates the fiction, then, is apparently Greene’s ideal. This is ‘faith’ as opposed to ‘belief’, 
as Greene’s friend and travelling companion, Father Leopoldo Durán, explains: 
Immediately after we had first met each other, he [Greene] told me on different occasions that each 
day he found he had less ‘belief’ but more ‘faith’. By ‘belief’ he meant the kind of faith that is 
based on reason, or better still, on the reasons that support one’s faith – in other words, to use the 
language of theology, faith assisted by ‘motivation for credibility’. (98) 
This describes the same man who decades earlier had written about his conversion to the 
Catholic Church: ‘I had not been converted to a religious faith. I had been convinced by 
specific arguments in the probability of its creed’ (Ways of Escape 54). Greene’s own 
religious development seems to follow a pattern which can perhaps be summed up in the 
words ratio praecedit fidem – an inversion of Augustine’s dictum very much in the spirit of 
Unamuno. Reason, or ‘belief’, precedes faith and is apparently superseded by it. 
Graham Greene was a Catholic for most of his life and a member of the Communist Party for 
only four weeks at the age of nineteen; paradoxically, Greene’s Catholicism also meant a 
lifelong interest in communism, which he saw as a ‘faith’ and not just an ideology: ‘A writer 
who is a Catholic cannot help having a certain sympathy for any faith which is sincerely held’ 
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(Ways of Escape 91). In The Power and the Glory there is a brief, tentative dialogue between 
a Catholic and a militant atheist; forty years later, in Monsignor Quixote, where circumstances 
are more favourable, there is a genuine dialogue and a growing understanding between a 
Catholic and a Marxist. Greene’s emphasis on ‘faith’ rather than ‘belief’ bears a close 
resemblance to Unamuno’s ‘faith in an intimate, organic Catholicism, wellspring of reflex 
actions’ and antagonism towards one that ‘is concretized in formulas and concepts’ (4: ix). 
Furthermore, Greene’s search for a dialogue between the two great ‘faiths’ of the 20th century, 
Catholicism and communism, can be compared with Unamuno’s search for a synthesis of 
Catholicism and liberalism, which has been referred to earlier. It comes as no surprise, then, 
that Greene and Unamuno shared a love of Browning’s poem ‘Bishop Blougram’s Apology’, 
which has already been discussed in some detail. Greene writes that ‘if I were to choose an 
epigraph for all the novels I have written, it would be from “Bishop Blougram’s Apology”’ (A 
Sort of Life 85): 
Our interest’s on the dangerous edge of things. 
The honest thief, the tender murderer, 
The superstitious atheist, demirep 
That loves and saves her soul in new French books – 
We watch while these in equilibrium keep 
The giddy line midway. 
(395–400) 
Surely Greene chose these lines for their emphasis on contrasts and paradoxes? Not a few of 
his characters, after all, find themselves precariously balanced on ‘the dangerous edge of 
things’ because of the paradoxes they embody. Such paradoxes are central to Christianity and 
should not be seen as merely a fringe concern of Browning’s, Greene’s, and Unamuno’s. 
Indeed, nowhere in Greene’s fiction is there anything to match the paradox of ‘the honest 
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thief’ who is crucified with Jesus and, in response to his prayer, receives the astonishing 
pledge: ‘Verily I say unto thee, To day shalt thou be with me in paradise’ (Luke 23.43). 
There is no denying the theoretical difficulty accompanying a discussion of philosophy 
and religion in Greene’s fiction. One must, as always, be careful to distinguish between the 
views of the characters or narrator and those of the author. The voices in a novel do not 
represent the author, either singly or collectively. No coherent philosophy or creed can be 
derived from Greene’s fiction, and even if it could, there would be no way of knowing 
whether it would be Greene’s own. The relationship between author and fiction takes a more 
subtle form. The fiction is the product of the author’s life and imagination. The motivation 
may be – among others – to earn money, to tell a good story, to escape boredom or madness. 
Indeed, Greene experimented with Russian roulette, alcohol, drugs, women, dentists, and 
dangerous travel as ways of escape. All of this filters through into Greene’s fiction, and helps 
produce that state of mind which critics have named ‘Greeneland’, but which Greene himself 
insists is part of the real world as experienced by himself. Greene’s lifelong struggle with 
faith and belief, his appetite for theology and philosophy, his extensive reading and retentive 
memory, his interest in communism, his individualism and distrust of authority, his 
experience of life in the 20th century – including the Second World War, the cold war, and 
colonial wars of independence – all this and much else contribute to Greene’s fiction.  
Most of Greene’s work contains significant elements of autobiography, yet it is not 
one particular voice in a novel, but the whole of the novel that represents, obliquely, the 
author’s mind or mood, his interests and preoccupations, at a certain point in time. Greene 
writes in a letter to his friend and fellow Catholic, the novelist Evelyn Waugh: 
With a writer of your genius and insight I certainly would not attempt to hide behind the time-old 
gag that an author can never be identified with his characters. Of course in some of Querry’s 
reactions [in A Burnt-out Case] there are reactions of mine, just as in some of Fowler’s reactions in 
The Quiet American there are reactions of mine. I suppose the points where an author is in 
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agreement with his character lend what force or warmth there is to the expression. At the same 
time I think that a parallel must not be drawn all down the line and not necessarily to the 
conclusion of the line. (Ways of Escape 255) 
The fiction, in Greene’s case, is distilled in various ways and to various degrees from the 
author’s experience. Different characters in the novel may represent different aspects of this 
experience combined with more obviously fictional elements. 
As will be seen later, Unamuno considers fiction to be more real than history because 
it is more generalised and hence more applicable to a variety of situations. A work of fiction, 
because it is ideally the story of no one in particular, can be the story of anyone and everyone. 
Applicability, however, is not to be confused with moral prescriptivism, as Greene 
particularly warns against confusing ‘the functions of a novelist and the functions of a moral 
teacher or theologian’ (Ways of Escape 256). Perhaps the greatest difference is that fiction 
allows many different possible applications or interpretations, while a gospel parable, for 
instance, usually has an authoritative, revealed explanation. Furthermore, fiction is free to 
explore heresy and apostasy without the author necessarily identifying with them; a 
theologian would traditionally feel bound to argue explicitly against them. 
This, then, suggests a reading of Greene’s work that sees a link rather than a bond 
between life and fiction, the latter being shaped in many ways by the former, but without any 
single authoritative interpretation being imposed. For instance, much of Greene’s fiction is in 
some way amusing or entertaining; some of his novels are thrillers dealing with crime or 
espionage, some are set in exotic locations, almost all are exciting, and for many readers, 
these may be their main attractions. Others may discern a troubled and restless mind behind 
the fiction, as did Pope Pius XII (1939–58) who, after reading The End of the Affair, 
reportedly told the future Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster, John Carmel Heenan: ‘I think 
this man [Greene] is in trouble. If he ever comes to you, you must help him’ (Ways of Escape 
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139). And finally it is possible to see Greene’s fiction as a vehicle for philosophical and 
theological exploration. 
A sensible piece of advice Graham Greene once received was: ‘You must never when 
you write a novel include something which has happened to you without in some way 
changing it’ (Ways of Escape 295). This is, perhaps, the most basic distinction between fiction 
on the one hand and autobiography or reportage on the other. Nevertheless, some knowledge 
of Greene’s biography can be useful for a reading of his work. Greene himself sometimes 
suggests the real-life ‘origins’ of certain characters or episodes in his fiction. But, more 
importantly, Greene’s fiction can be seen as a reflection of many of his own constant concerns 
and preoccupations. Thus, this thesis will, as far as possible, lay aside specific details of 
Greene’s biography and concentrate instead on what shapes his fiction. 
Rather than tracing this through all Greene’s fiction chronologically with equal 
emphasis on each work, the emphasis here will be on three late novels, The Human Factor 
(1978), Doctor Fischer of Geneva (1980), and Monsignor Quixote (1982), with reference to 
earlier works where appropriate. Except for The Captain and the Enemy (1988), these are in 
fact Greene’s last novels, because The Tenth Man (1985) was finished some forty years prior 
to publication. The three novels stand out as a group of quite diverse books published within 
the relatively short period of time from 1978 to 1982, though it should perhaps be noted that 
The Human Factor was begun more than ten years before it was published and at one point 
temporarily abandoned by the author (Ways of Escape 298). The three novels are quite 
different in genre and tone, but the central theme of all is political, social, or religious 
dislocation in one form or another. When a person feels dislocated in this way, it may prompt 
different sorts of reaction, which may be more or less rational. But, in the end, such 
dislocation may lead to a questioning of the very political, social, or religious categories that 
have caused the dislocation in the first case. 
 27 
 
Chapter Two: The Terrible Danger 
Maurice Castle, the protagonist of The Human Factor (1978), is quite an unlikely traitor. 
Doctor Percival warns against ‘people who believe. They aren’t reliable players’ (163). 
Colonel Daintry thinks that ‘it’s generally the brilliant and ambitious who are dangerous’ (32). 
Castle, however, fits neither description. Instead, he claims to be a ‘half believer’ who has 
‘left God behind in the school chapel’ and who does not ‘have any trust in Marx or Lenin any 
more than […] in Saint Paul’ (107). He is academically undistinguished, having taken ‘a very 
poor third’ (12) in Modern History at Christ Church, Oxford; his main ambition is to lead a 
quiet life in Berkhamsted with his wife, Sarah, and her son, Sam. Yet Castle is, by his own 
admission, ‘what’s generally called a traitor’ (187). At the end of the novel he finds himself in 
exile in Moscow, involuntarily separated from Sarah and Sam. Why, for no personal gain and 
contrary to every expectation, does Maurice Castle become a traitor? What, moreover, is the 
moral and religious significance of The Human Factor, and how does the novel relate to 
Graham Greene’s other works of fiction, especially in the context of Unamuno’s philosophy? 
The reasons for Castle’s behaviour must be sought in his own personality and in his 
attitude to private life. The name ‘Castle’ itself characterises the man. It recalls not only 
Berkhamsted’s ruined medieval castle but also the saying that ‘an Englishman’s home is his 
castle’. It signals a defensive attitude, a fortress mentality, and even an unwillingness to 
engage with the outside world. Castle is described as ‘a creature of habit’ (19) who above all 
seeks a ‘sense of security’ (21). In the words of Grahame Smith, Castle has ‘a longing for the 
minimal, yet all-important, joy of a private life in a world riven by abstractions and violence: 
the creation of a world within a world’ (192). While the example of Unamuno shows that a 
quiet, domestic life is compatible with great intellectual curiosity, Castle shows absolutely no 
sign of this. He has ‘no politics’ and has not even ‘voted once since the war’ (13). The novel 
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initially leads one to believe that Castle has some literary interests, as he pretends to read 
Clarissa Harlowe (9) and Tolstoy’s War and Peace (44). Yet it emerges that he only uses the 
novels as a means of communicating with the KGB in book code. Furthermore, he has no 
religious or social life, spending nearly all his time either at home or at work in an unchanging 
routine. He successfully hides his quiet, unobtrusive alcoholism from everyone except his 
wife, who does not seem to mind. Castle’s presence, one feels, is terribly unobtrusive and 
self-denying, quite the opposite of Unamuno’s insistent and self-centred yo. 
Castle suffers from a feeling of inferiority aggravated by his infertility. Sam is Sarah’s 
son by another man, yet Castle claims he is content to be childless himself, telling his wife: 
‘You want to look under stones too much, Sarah. I love Sam because he’s yours. Because he’s 
not mine. Because I don’t have to see anything of myself there when I look at him. I see only 
something of you. I don’t want to go on for ever. I want the buck to stop here’ (24). To Castle, 
a child is simply ‘a responsibility’ (23), not a source of joy or pride; just as the ineffectual 
watchdog, Buller, is ‘only one more responsibility’ (58). Castle’s attitude is instinctively 
defensive and evasive, displaying the deep insecurity of a man who does not believe anything 
of himself to be of permanent value. In Castle, then, Greene has created a character who 
directly contradicts what Unamuno sees as an innate human desire for immortality, the 
continuation for ever of one’s own personal consciousness. Castle only desires his own 
annihilation or destruction, thereby committing ‘the sin against the Holy Ghost, for which, 
according to the Gospel, there is no remission,’ which Unamuno believes ‘is none other than 
that of not desiring God, that of not longing to be made eternal’ (4: 270–1). Castle’s attitude is 
nothing less than irreligious, for ‘religion is not the longing for self-annihilation, but for 
completion, a longing for life and not for death’ (4: 239). 
While Unamuno’s philosophy springs from his own experience – as a father – of the 
death of his sick child, Castle’s outlook stems from his inability to father a child at all. 
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Unamuno furiously rebels against reason and embraces faith; Castle meekly accepts his 
sterility as proof of his own inferiority. In Unamunian terms, Castle is a rationalist who does 
not have the wisdom to doubt his own reason, who is unable to see the flaws in his own 
reasoning – unlike Sancho in Don Quixote or the Mayor in Monsignor Quixote. Castle has 
perversely convinced himself that it is best for all concerned that he should be sterile. This 
conviction comes at a grave cost to his own self-image, since it leads him to radically reject 
his own self-worth. The novel strongly suggests that Castle’s insecurity has its origin in his 
childhood. His mother, Mrs Castle, tells him: ‘You always had an exaggerated sense of 
gratitude for the least kindness. It was a sort of insecurity, though why you should have felt 
insecure with me and your father …’ (111). Mrs Castle accurately identifies her son’s problem, 
but she instinctively shrinks from any kind of self-criticism. Ultimately, the cause of Castle’s 
downfall is precisely his inordinate sense of gratitude, stemming in all probability from his 
sense of insecurity. Tragically, it is his gratitude to Carson for rescuing Sarah from the BOSS, 
the South African secret police, that prompts Castle to commit acts that result in the 
disintegration of his home and his own separation from Sarah and Sam. 
On the religious plane, the novel shows two main concerns. One is the contrasts and 
similarities between a religious faith, Catholicism, and a political faith, communism, and 
Castle’s inability to commit himself to either. The other concern revolves around the conflict 
between Castle’s desire for both confession and secrecy. On the moral plane, the novel 
presents an example of a completely individualistic ethical system, where the ‘players’ are 
free to assign any or no moral value to their activities, but are still bound by the consequences. 
Catholicism and communism are the two major faiths that present themselves to Castle; he 
rejects both, apparently because of the inadequacy of their representatives and the atrocities 
committed in their name. That Castle sees communism in this way becomes clear when he 
tells Boris, his KGB control, that ‘I’ve never pretended that I share your faith – I’ll never be a 
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Communist’ (121). Christianity appeals more to Castle than communism, but is still beyond 
his reach. To Castle, ‘Christ’ remains ‘that legendary figure whom he would have liked to 
believe in’ (147), which is interesting because it actually signals a desire for faith. This desire, 
however, is so deeply repressed as to be almost extinct in Castle. 
Castle’s rejection of Catholicism and communism is expressed in personified terms: ‘I 
don’t have any trust in Marx or Lenin any more than I have in Saint Paul’ (107). To Castle 
these are simply proponents of different ideologies, and he chooses not to differentiate 
between them, which can only be seen as a gross oversimplification. Castle is unable or 
unwilling to commit himself to abstractions, seeing instead only human faces: 
I was never a religious man – I left God behind in the school chapel, but there were priests I 
sometimes met in Africa who made me believe again – for a moment – over a drink. If all priests 
had been like they were and I had seen them often enough, perhaps I would have swallowed the 
Resurrection, the Virgin birth, Lazarus, the whole works. (107). 
Here, in biblical terms, Castle is demanding a sign: if only all priests were as he would want 
them to be, or if only all communists were like his idol Carson, then perhaps he could believe. 
But they are not, as Castle knows perfectly well; it sounds more like an excuse than a reason 
for not believing. Indeed, it is clear that Castle has no real desire for faith, probably because 
he does not long, as Unamuno does, for personal immortality; on the contrary, he explicitly 
states that he does not ‘want to go on for ever’ (24). Unlike Unamuno, Castle has no use for 
God as a guarantee of his own continued existence after death; he does not feel the need to 
struggle with doubt and faith and reason. To Castle, faith does not mean a ‘vital belief’ 
(Unamuno 4: 64) and a ‘hunger for immortality’ (4: 65), but only giving his consent to a set of 
theological propositions, such as the Resurrection and the Virgin birth. Yet as Unamuno 
points out repeatedly, religion is not an intellectual game: it is a vital need. 
‘The terrible danger’, in the words of Unamuno, ‘lies in […] attempting to believe 
with one’s reason rather than with one’s life’ (4: 86). Unamuno insists on the limitations of 
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theology which, to him, represents an attempt ‘to rationalize faith’ (4: 64); whereas faith lies 
outside the limits of rationality, in ‘Tertullian’s absurdity, the impossibility of the certum est, 
quia impossibile est’ (4: 116). A rationalised faith, according to Unamuno, satisfies neither 
faith nor reason – it certainly does not appeal to Castle; of ‘vital belief’ he has no conception 
at all, nor could he have embraced it without a radical change of heart. To share Unamuno’s 
‘vital belief’, one must, unlike Castle, believe in oneself enough to long for one’s own 
immortality. This is precluded by Castle’s feeling of inadequacy and inferiority. 
As for the doctrine of communism as such, it can hold little attraction for Castle; in its 
Soviet form it offers very little room for the kind of suburban privacy and seclusion that he 
clearly craves. In Moscow, Castle is quite lost in his state-provided flat. Castle’s loyalty is to 
Carson, not to communism. Indeed, Castle is perfectly well aware of the horrors of Soviet 
communism, such as the practice of imprisoning political opponents in psychiatric institutions 
– a point he makes to silence old Halliday, who is a desperately uncritical believer in 
communism (221). Hegelian dialectics, an important part of the philosophical foundations of 
Marxism, Castle dismisses as ‘all jargon’ (221). One can thus safely believe Castle when he 
says he will ‘never be a Communist’ (121), which makes the sad irony of his defection to 
Moscow all the greater. 
While Castle cannot embrace faith, there is one aspect of Catholicism that attracts him: 
the sacrament of confession; or, more precisely, the secrecy of the confessional. Castle 
‘harbors deep guilt that stems […] from the heavy burden of secrecy and duplicity’ (Hoskins 
236) surrounding his activities as a double agent. In particular, the environment of secrecy 
and guilty tension tends to erode the trust between Castle and Sarah: ‘Don’t you trust me?’ he 
asks, and she can only answer, ‘Of course I trust you, but …’ (171). This ‘but …’ is what 
torments Castle more than anything, representing the professional lack of trust that surrounds 
him at all times. Sarah senses his tension and is herself affected by it, all the more so because 
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she is unaware of its cause: she knows that he is a spy, but not that he is a double agent. She 
cannot help resenting the secrecy surrounding Castle’s job: ‘A department of the Foreign 
Office. Everyone knows what that means, but you have to go around with your mouth shut 
like a criminal. If you told me – me, your wife – what you’d done today, they’d sack you. I 
wish they would sack you. What have you done today?’ (22–23). The continuing secrecy is a 
considerable source of disappointment and disillusionment: 
Sarah said, ‘I sometimes wish I was still your agent. You tell me so much less than you did 
then.’ 
‘I never told you much – perhaps you thought I did, but I told you as little as I could, for 
your own safety, and then it was often lies. Like the book I intended to write on apartheid.’ 
‘I thought things would be different,’ Sarah said, ‘in England. I thought there would be no 
more secrets.’ (153) 
This passage reveals the motivation for Castle’s secrecy: for Sarah’s own safety, so as not to 
be implicated in her husband’s acts of treason, she must not know that he is a double agent. 
Only when it becomes clear that he is about to be discovered can he tell her, warning her to 
stay away from him. 
The Human Factor, then, revolves around the themes of confession and secrecy. An 
ingenious comparison is made between priests and spies, for instance when Castle reflects on 
his relationship with Boris: ‘A control was a bit like a priest must be to a Catholic – a man 
who received one’s confession whatever it might be without emotion’ (117). The comparison 
is given a slightly absurd twist during a strange conversation in the bar at White’s Club 
between Colonel Daintry and a group of young clubmen. One of them explains to his 
companions that ‘the Colonel belongs to the hush-hush boys, and so in a way does a 
clergyman, when you come to think of it … You know, the secrets of the confessional and all 
that, they are in the hush-hush business too’ (167). Colonel Daintry’s father was an Anglican 
clergyman, but he ‘had never approved of confession nor of the confessional box set up by a 
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High Church celibate in the next parish’ (169). The emphasis in the novel, however, is very 
much on the Roman Catholic sacrament of confession; with Roman Catholics, Castle 
observes, ‘customs seemed to survive longer’ (182). 
Believing himself abandoned by Boris, and still unable to confide in Sarah, Castle – 
drawn by loneliness to enter a ‘hideous’, new Roman Catholic church – turns in desperation 
to the confessional, only to discover that he has ‘fallen by a grim coincidence on another 
victim of loneliness and silence like himself’ (184), the antithesis of the sympathetic priests he 
had known in Africa. The priest quickly discovers that Castle is neither a Catholic nor a 
potential convert, tells him to go and see a doctor instead, and slams the shutter in his face. 
The priest’s behaviour is insensitive to say the least, but Castle really has come to the wrong 
place with the wrong motive. Confession is a sacrament in Roman Catholicism, not just ‘a 
therapeutic act’ (183), and Castle cynically intends to exploit the secrecy of the confessional, 
thinking: ‘I want to talk; why don’t I talk? A priest like that has to keep my secret’ (183). He 
wants the secrecy of the confessional without the sacrament, but can have neither. 
Maurice Castle’s ethical system, it emerges, is completely individualistic. He 
explicitly rejects both Catholicism and communism, the two major faiths that would provide 
him with both community and guidance. The pillars of Castle’s ethical system are twofold: 
loyalty to his own private world, consisting of Sarah, Sam, and himself; and gratitude to 
Carson, without whose assistance this private world would not have existed. Castle does have 
deeply moral instincts, as illustrated by his commitment to Sarah, Sam, and Carson. This 
commitment, however, is tainted by egoism. Thus, Castle’s gratitude to Carson is not just for 
rescuing Sarah from danger, but for rescuing Sarah for him. And as much as Castle loves his 
wife, he is pleased that, because of the age difference between them, he can confidently 
expect to be spared the loneliness of old age as a widower. Yet these are perfectly 
understandable, human flaws. The more serious problem is that Castle’s fundamental moral 
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instincts apparently have not been formed into a coherent, principled whole. He lacks a sense 
of direction and proportion which might have been provided by an external point of reference 
such as Catholicism or communism, which are the two alternatives suggested in the novel. 
While he assiduously avoids any political or religious influence on his life, Castle is easily 
touched – even manipulated – by ‘the human factor’: ‘He could seldom resist a call of 
distress’ (127). Even this he casts in carefully non-religious terms: ‘Perhaps he had merely 
wanted her [Sarah] to feel that she was loved by someone and so he began to love her himself. 
It wasn’t pity, any more than it had been pity when he fell in love with Sarah pregnant by 
another man. He was there to right the balance. That was all’ (147). Clearly the term ‘pity’ is 
too overtly religious for Castle. But while ‘pity’ may seem both obnoxious and patronising, at 
least it is a human emotion, whereas ‘righting the balance’ sounds both impersonal and 
mechanical. The notion of ‘the right balance’ (147) is closely connected with Castle’s life as a 
double agent. It is his way of seeking to be even-handed in the spy-game, avoiding a definite 
commitment to one side only. Wanting to live on his own individualistic terms, he desires ‘a 
permanent home, in a city where he could be accepted as a citizen, as a citizen without any 
pledge of faith, not the City of God or Marx, but the city called Peace of Mind’ (107). Yet the 
novel demonstrates that there is no peace of mind to be had by Castle’s ostrich-like evasion. 
Castle thinks that he is doing no harm by his activities as a double agent, since he is 
only passing on fairly unimportant bits of information to the KGB; in fact he causes serious 
harm both to himself and to others. Yet his incompetence as a spy, though ‘first-class, of 
course, with files’ (32), mostly serves to create sympathy for Castle. Indeed, it is a recurring 
feature of Greene’s fiction to place an ordinary person – like Castle – in an extraordinary 
position, as if to see what will happen. Indeed, Davis’ death does turn out to be a major test 
for Castle. His murder is a callous and stupid mistake on the part of Doctor Percival and Sir 
John Hargreaves, but Castle is at least indirectly to blame. Castle attempts to repress the event, 
 35 
even forgetting about Davis’ funeral. His excuse is that he has both ‘an official diary and a 
private diary’ and that he is ‘always forgetting to compare the two’ (155), which is another 
example of how Castle attempts to compartmentalise his life, keeping the private strictly 
separate from the official. But a more plausible reason, which Castle himself hints at to Muller 
of the BOSS, is that he wants to forget. Davis’ death is too disturbing for Castle to confront 
directly and honestly. Castle displays an unpleasant, calculating side when Muller asks him: 
‘This man Davis – perhaps he didn’t mean very much to you?’ Castle answers: ‘Well, not as 
much as Carson. Whom your people killed’ (155). To Castle, every human life is not of equal, 
intrinsic value. The value of a person’s life varies, depending on what that person means to 
Castle. On the practical level, however, Davis’ death is potentially convenient to Castle: it 
provides him with the perfect opportunity to end his career as a double agent without any fear 
of discovery. On the other hand, it makes it ‘suicide’ (186) for Castle to go on as before. This 
is a crucial moment in the plot of the novel. Castle is offered a real choice: he is not driven to 
self-destruction solely by outside forces over which he has no control; he chooses to risk 
everything ‘to right the balance’ (147) and, as he claims, to ‘save a lot of lives’ (187). 
It is the enormity of Operation Uncle Remus that apparently compels Castle to 
compromise himself, trying to foil the plan by revealing it to the KGB. Castle’s moral 
confusion is again apparent. Why are the lives of ‘a lot’ of strangers so important, when 
Davis’ apparently is not? Is Castle trying to make Davis’ death meaningful as part of the 
struggle against apartheid? And what about Castle’s responsibility for Sarah and Sam? Sarah 
certainly is not persuaded: ‘Don’t talk to me of my people. I have no people any longer. You 
are “my people”’ (187). In the end, Castle’s sacrifice is in vain, as his integrity is 
compromised by association with Soviet propaganda. The revelation of Operation Uncle 
Remus is inevitably overshadowed by Castle’s defection. Even his mother can only see, with 
‘dry and merciless’ eyes, that her son is a ‘traitor’ (262).
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In The Human Factor, childhood and children form a counterweight to the 
individualistic and relativistic moral system espoused not only by Castle but also by Doctor 
Percival and Sir John Hargreaves. Indeed, children can be said to truly represent ‘the human 
factor’. Castle is the only character who is in direct, regular contact with a child, Sam, but 
without great success. Castle is nostalgic about his own childhood fantasies about knights and 
a dragon, but these fantasies are not shared by Sam who, ironically, is much more interested 
in spies and tanks. Interestingly, the most sympathetic character in the novel, Davis, is also a 
great success with Sam. Davis is the person who has been most resistant to the secretive and 
repressive environment of the Secret Service. Involuntary childlessness is clearly one of the 
worst things that can happen to a couple. Children very much represent the continuation of 
life and happiness, but they are also fragile and vulnerable. The image of Mary with the child 
Jesus and the image of the mother with her dead son – the Pietà – are perhaps the strongest 
and most human in Christian iconography. Castle, however, is physically unable to have 
children, and, indeed, has turned this into a conviction that he is somehow unworthy of 
existence. His colleague Davis is an unhappy bachelor who is very good with children, as 
demonstrated by Sam’s affection for him. Colonel Daintry is divorced and has practically no 
contact with his daughter. Sir John Hargreaves and his American wife are deliberately 
childless. The sinister Doctor Percival is unmarried. These are all, in one way or another, 
thwarted or warped individuals. Children can be seen as a lifeline to both humanity and 
immortality, yet these characters are in varying degrees and ways cut off from contact with 
children. Children also endow the future with special importance, because parents naturally 
wish to make the world the best possible place for their offspring. 
Lack of contact with children, then, represents estrangement from life, which can be 
treated as a ‘game’, also indicating a failure to grow up emotionally. Colonel Daintry, even 
with his very limited contact with his grown daughter, is more human, if less imaginative, 
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than Sir John Hargreaves and Doctor Percival. These two men have deliberately cut 
themselves off from humanity. Only someone who has been utterly dehumanised can say, like 
Hargreaves, that human beings are ‘the best target’ (53) for shooting. As for Doctor Percival, 
Sharrock feels that he has a ‘vision of life as an amoral pattern of abstract squares’ (59), as 
represented by a modern painting by Ben Nicholson (1894–1982). To him, Davis’ death is but 
a medical experiment and the Secret Service is but a ‘game we’re all playing’ (163). Thus, 
Grahame Smith can describe Doctor Percival as ‘Greene’s most persuasive portrait of an evil 
which is as absolute as it is unmelodramatic’ (190). 
To Doctor Percival and Hargreaves, the gentlemen’s clubs of London provide a haven 
free from women and children. A man’s choice of club also characterises his personality, as 
he can be expected to join one where he can meet men like himself. Thus, Hargreaves, who 
has been a British colonial administrator in West Africa, is naturally a member of the 
Travellers Club, whereas Doctor Percival is, rather incongruously, a member of the Reform 
Club next door in Pall Mall. Indeed, Doctor Percival takes a perverse pleasure in his 
membership of a club founded in support of the liberal Reform Act of 1832, which he 
denounces for having ‘opened the gates to the pernicious doctrine of one man one vote’ (79). 
This reinforces the notion of Doctor Percival’s amorality: it is all a game. In contrast, Colonel 
Daintry ‘never liked clubs’ (84), preferring to lunch on half a tin of sardines in the solitude of 
his bachelor’s flat in St James’s. Castle, who commutes to Berkhamsted and is perfectly 
happy with suburban family life, has no interest in joining a club. Indeed, club membership, 
like membership in a political or religious organisation, seems quite incompatible with 
Castle’s clear preference for the private life. 
How, then, does The Human Factor relate to Graham Greene’s other fiction? First of 
all, the novel contains much material that is in one way or another autobiographical. This is 
characteristic of much of Greene’s fiction, as he draws on his own experience of life, 
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transforming it into literature. Secondly, by this late stage in his writing career, Greene is able 
to make implicit references, not only to his own extensive knowledge of world literature, but 
also to his own earlier novels. Thirdly, The Human Factor marks both a culmination and a 
transformation of the author’s own distinctive genre, the thriller-entertainment, turning it into 
a vehicle for philosophical and religious themes. Greene himself wanted The Human Factor 
to be a realistic portrayal of life in the British Secret Service. Having personally experienced 
this life in West Africa and London during the Second World War, the author had a specific 
project in mind when he started work on The Human Factor, described by Sharrock as 
‘humanizing the thriller form’ (254). In Greene’s own words: ‘I wanted to present the Service 
unromantically as a way of life, men going daily to their office to earn their pensions, the 
background much like that of any other profession – whether the bank clerk or the business 
director – an undangerous routine, and within each character the more important private life’ 
(Ways of Escape 296). In this scheme, Castle is a spy who apparently leads the life of any 
other civil servant. He is, moreover, a happily married man, which is quite unusual in 
Greene’s fiction. An important function of Castle’s domestic happiness is to set him radically 
apart from the characters of traditional spy fiction. 
There are some clear similarities between Castle and Greene, as in The Human Factor 
the author makes imaginative use of autobiographical elements. For instance, Castle and 
Greene share a sense of nostalgia for their childhood in Berkhamsted, particularly of the castle, 
the church, and the common. Castle’s childhood memories also include an imaginary dragon 
which is a relation of the one that inhabited Greene’s own childhood fantasies. Like Greene, 
Castle has served as an intelligence agent in Africa. But while Greene was stationed in Sierra 
Leone during the war, Castle’s mission took him to South Africa during the years of apartheid. 
The main difference, however, between the author and Castle is that the latter has made a 
career in the Secret Service, whereas Greene saw temporary service during the Second World 
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War. None of this makes Castle a copy of Greene, but shows that, in the words of H. C. 
Andersen, which serve as an epigram for The Human Factor, ‘out of reality are our tales of 
imagination fashioned’ (7). 
There are, indeed, important differences between Castle and Greene. Hoskins goes too 
far when he suggests that Castle is Greene’s ‘double’ (232), but his suggestion is perhaps 
understandable given the close link between autobiography and fiction in Greene’s work 
which creates some interesting theoretical difficulties. Yet to see Castle as Greene’s ‘double’ 
would imply an unusually high degree of identification between the author and his character. 
Instead it seems that Greene, no doubt with the recent defection of his friend, Kim Philby, in 
painful memory, is exploring how a man with a background not dissimilar to his own can 
become a defector. It is often fascinating to ponder alternative courses to one’s own life; in 
this sense, Castle can perhaps be seen as an imaginary alternative version rather than the 
‘double’ of his author. 
In The Human Factor, Greene draws not only on his own autobiography, but also on 
his earlier fiction. The names Maurice and Sarah evoke those of Maurice Bendrix and Sarah 
Miles, the ill-fated lovers in Greene’s earlier novel, The End of the Affair (1951). Thus, as 
Hoskins observes, ‘not just the writer’s own history but also his earlier works become part of 
his subject’ (235). The rather obvious reference to the earlier love story invites a comparison 
between the two novels and a search for similarities, yet one could argue that the differences 
are just as significant. For instance, as a civil servant and a man of routine, Maurice Castle has 
more in common with Sarah Miles’ sedate husband than with her jealous lover, the author 
Maurice Bendrix. 
The references to The End of the Affair and other literary love stories contrast with the 
ostensible spy thriller form of the novel. Thus, perhaps the main function of the parallel 
names – apart from keeping critics busy – is to focus attention on the love story within the spy 
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thriller. Furthermore, Castle’s first name serves as a private code in his and Sarah’s love life: 
‘The use of his name was a sign of love – when they were together it was an invitation to love. 
Endearments – dear and darling – were everyday currency to be employed in company, but a 
name was strictly private, never to be betrayed to a stranger outside the tribe. At the height of 
love she would cry aloud his secret tribal name’ (69). Castle the double agent uses book code 
to communicate with the KGB. In the above passage, Maurice and Sarah Castle’s own secret 
code is revealed. At the same time one can discern in the names Maurice and Sarah another 
‘book code’ that evokes the affair of Maurice Bendrix and Sarah Miles. The coded reference 
to the earlier novel helps to make a more explicit description of Maurice and Sarah Castle’s 
passion superfluous. The monotony and privacy of the Castles’ life, then, does not signal an 
unhappy marriage. On the contrary, they welcome the secrecy: ‘The depth of their love was as 
secret as the quadruple measure of whisky. To speak of it to others would invite danger. Love 
was a total risk. Literature had always so proclaimed it. Tristan, Anna Karenina, even the lust 
of Lovelace – he had glanced at the last volume of Clarissa’ (20). This indicates that literature 
in general, not just Greene’s ‘earlier works’ have ‘become part of his subject’. In addition to 
the implicit allusion to The End of the Affair, the explicit reference to Tristan, Anna Karenina 
and Clarissa self-consciously locates The Human Factor more within the tradition of the 
literary love story than that of the spy thriller. 
The use of last names and assumed names signals isolation and estrangement, whereas 
the use of the name ‘Maurice’ signals intimacy, loyalty and love. The importance of first 
names in the novel is further emphasised by Castle: ‘Strange, he thought, that Sarah and Boris 
were the only people in the world who ever called him Maurice. To his mother he was simply 
“dear” in moments of affection, and at the office he lived among surnames and initials’ (116). 
Thus, by the use of ‘his secret tribal name’, both Boris and Sarah put in their competing 
claims for Castle’s loyalty. There is, however, a significant imbalance in Castle’s relationship 
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with Boris: ‘He [Castle] thought, with a sense of revulsion: “The situation’s impossible, 
there’s no one in the world with whom I can talk of everything, except this man Boris whose 
real name even is unknown to me”’ (117). Castle has made himself dependent on Boris, just 
as Sarah is dependent on Castle. This creates a hierarchy of secrecy and deception. Boris 
keeps secrets from Castle, who finds himself having to keep secrets from Sarah. Thus, despite 
the apparent happiness of Castle’s domestic arrangements, he cannot ultimately be trusted. A 
wish to ‘right the balance’, however sincerely held, is not a sufficient foundation for either 
married life or for an ethical system. The fact that Castle in the end chooses a path that 
separates him from Sarah shows that either his commitment or his judgement is impaired, or 
both. Sarah, one feels, has become more a means to ‘a sense of security’ rather than an end in 
herself. 
While it lasts, however, Maurice and Sarah Castle are another example of a protective 
relationship between an older man and a younger woman common in Greene’s fiction. Indeed, 
Castle is unusual as the protagonist of a spy story also in that he is quite old – ‘over retirement 
age’ (118) – which makes one wonder why he does not simply escape his troubles by retiring 
after Davis’ death. A suspicion therefore lingers that Castle himself, like Doctor Percival, has 
been caught up in the game and is unable to quit. Yet if the novel were to be as truly 
unromantic as Greene originally intended, what better end could possibly be devised than the 
secret agent quietly retiring from his job, perhaps with a minor honour ‘for services to export’ 
or the like? Such an ending, however, Greene had already made use of in his earlier spy-story, 
Our Man in Havana (1958). 
According to some critics, The Human Factor represents a secularisation of concerns 
in his earlier work. Thus, in Maria Couto’s opinion, The Human Factor ‘encapsulates in its 
title the concerns and questionings of Greene’s fiction but places them in a “secular context”’ 
(190). Hoskins, more specifically, believes that the novel, ‘in its treatment of love, can be read 
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as a rewriting – a secularizing – of The End of the Affair’ (238). This chapter, however, has 
attempted to place The Human Factor within a larger religious and philosophical context, 
drawing in particular on the thought of Unamuno. The ‘secular context’ of Castle’s existence 
is challenged by the intrusion of religious concerns. Religion may be marginalised, God may 
be ‘left […] behind in the school chapel’ (107), but religion is still the true context of the 
novel, no matter how secular Castle’s life may seem. If, as Unamuno believes, ‘those who 
deny God deny Him out of despair at not finding Him’ (4: 202), then it is precisely Castle’s 
rejection of faith that marks The Human Factor as a theological novel, and as such an 
important preparation for both Doctor Fischer of Geneva and Monsignor Quixote. 
 43 
 
Chapter Three: Ultimate Despair 
Very often, deceived by the Evil One, men have become vain in their reasonings, and have 
exchanged the truth of God for a lie, and served the creature rather than the Creator. Or else, living 
and dying in this world without God, they are exposed to ultimate despair. (Lumen Gentium 16; qtd 
in Catechism 844) 
The central theme of Graham Greene’s short novel Doctor Fischer of Geneva or the Bomb 
Party (1980) is despair in the face of life and death without God, or ‘ultimate despair’. This is 
what Jones, the first-person narrator of the story, feels when in the end he surrenders any hope 
of immortality for himself and Anna-Luise: ‘why’, he asks, contemplating the death of Doctor 
Fischer, ‘should goodness have more immortality than evil?’ (142). In Jones’ mind, goodness 
is associated with Anna-Luise and evil with Doctor Fischer, and it is the latter’s suicide that 
impresses upon him the finality of death. According to the philosophy of Unamuno, the tragic 
sense of life arises from the certainty of death, and the choice facing each person is between 
faith, leading to the authentic life, and reason, leading to despair. Accordingly, this chapter 
will discuss Doctor Fischer of Geneva not just as a moralist attack on the disgusting way of 
life of such nouveaux riches as Doctor Fischer, but as a study of human beings ‘living and 
dying in this world without God,’ and consequently, in the words of the Second Vatican 
Council, being ‘exposed to ultimate despair’ (Lumen Gentium 16; qtd in Catechism 844). 
Within this context it is also possible to discuss such themes as greed, love, happiness, power, 
and tyranny. Doctor Fischer of Geneva develops the theme of despair and rejection of religion 
found in The Human Factor, at the same time introducing by means of Doctor Fischer certain 
explicitly theological speculations about the nature of evil. Doctor Fischer of Geneva thus 
provides an important contrast to its immediate successor, Monsignor Quixote, which in the 
end is more concerned with the nature of good than of evil. 
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Doctor Fischer, the reclusive toothpaste millionaire, inhabits ‘a great white mansion in 
the classical style by the lakeside at Versoix outside Geneva’ (9). As Jones climbs the marble 
stairs to see his future father-in-law for the first time, he is confronted with ‘a painting of a 
woman in flowing robes holding, with an expression of great tenderness, a skull’ (27). The 
description of the painting is very economical, almost like an heraldic blazon, and affords a 
good example of Greene’s sparse, yet effective, style of writing. The skull is an unmistakable 
symbol of death, and the painting symbolically links femininity and mortality. Jones’ first 
wife was killed years earlier in the London blitz; Doctor Fischer’s wife Anna, the victim of 
her husband’s hate, has died ‘like an African who can just will herself to die’ (41); and Anna-
Luise, Doctor Fischer’s daughter who marries Jones, will later be killed in a freak skiing 
accident. As survivors, both Doctor Fischer and Jones are forced to contemplate the meaning 
of death and life. Unable or unwilling to embrace faith and attain what Unamuno sees as the 
authentic life, Doctor Fischer commits suicide, and Jones, after a failed suicide attempt, goes 
on living, hopelessly, with his bitterness and his fading memory of love. 
Doctor Fischer of Geneva was published at a time when Graham Greene, living at 
Antibes in the south of France, was deeply involved in a legal and moral struggle on behalf of 
Martine, the daughter of his ‘close friend’ (Durán 15), Yvonne Cloetta. Martine was terrorised 
by her husband, Daniel Guy, a local gangster. Her plight eventually led Greene to write a 
short pamphlet, J’accuse: The Dark Side of Nice (1982), published in French and English, 
denouncing not only the local mafia but also the widespread corruption of the legal and 
political system of Nice. At the centre of Martine’s problems was her husband’s extreme 
jealousy and possessiveness, which meant that Martine’s apparently innocent friendship with 
a male colleague was intolerable to him. As Hoskins points out, ‘Greene’s description, in 
J’accuse, of Daniel Guy’s jealousy and its effects sounds rather like Doctor Fischer’s jealousy 
of his wife’s friendship with Steiner’ (250). Daniel Guy reportedly said of his wife and her 
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colleague: ‘At all events they were friends, and so far as I’m concerned friendship is the same 
as adultery’ (J’accuse 13). Similarly, Doctor Fischer finds it intolerable that his wife 
‘preferred his [Steiner’s] company to mine. A clerk of Mr Kips earning a minimum wage’ 
(107), revealing beneath his studied indifference a deep sense of insecurity and vulnerability. 
Doctor Fischer’s entire self-image is founded on his financial success. He tells Jones that 
‘Some people even die for money […]. They don’t die for love except in novels’ (107); yet 
his wife has indeed died for love – or for the lack thereof. Doctor Fischer, then, is a man who 
has ‘exchanged the truth of God for a lie’, worshipping money and power instead of ‘the 
Creator’. Doctor Fischer’s life, in the end, must become intolerable to him because of its 
intrinsic emptiness and falseness. 
While the title of the short novel suggests that the story is centred on Doctor Fischer, 
Jones’ role as the first-person narrator makes him the character whose point of view prevails. 
Jones himself is the writer of the story, while disparaging his own personality: ‘The fact that I 
have written this narrative tells well enough that, unlike Doctor Fischer, I never found the 
courage necessary to kill myself’ (142). Thus, Jones has something in common with another 
bitter, thwarted first-person narrator, Maurice Bendrix in Greene’s The End of the Affair. 
Because Jones is the narrator, his bitterness and disillusionment is directly apparent in the text. 
Mrs Montgomery, for instance, is bitingly described as ‘satisfactorily widowed’ (10). Before 
he met Anna-Luise, Jones did not lack feminine company, for he ‘could always buy a 
copulation, even in Switzerland’ (13). Jones’ contempt for the rich is also apparent in the 
scathing observation that ‘Any millionaire gets an obituary in Switzerland’ (72). As usual in 
Greene’s fiction, the setting adds a particular flavour to the story, as Switzerland is presented, 
rather unflatteringly, as the perfect environment for Doctor Fischer. 
There are some other revealing points of contact in Doctor Fischer of Geneva with 
Greene’s earlier fiction. The three male characters Bendrix, Castle, and Jones are bound 
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together by having, like their author, survived the London blitz. During the war in real life, as 
in so much of Greene’s fiction, ordinary people were confronted with the most extraordinary 
circumstances, and indeed what makes both Castle and Jones interesting is their very 
mediocrity and ordinariness. They are not war heroes: they are casualties, and their stories 
would not ordinarily make it into the history books. In fiction, however, they can find their 
true place as representatives of their generation. Furthermore, Jones, the son of a minor 
British diplomat, grew up in France, Turkey, and Paraguay, which are precisely the countries 
visited by Henry Pulling in Travels with My Aunt, one of the first of Greene’s novels set in the 
‘tragicomic region of La Mancha’ (Ways of Escape 259) and in many ways a precursor to 
Monsignor Quixote. 
Jones lost his first wife in the blitz, and like Castle in The Human Factor he craves the 
false security of a much younger wife who might be expected to outlive him. Indeed, Jones is 
old enough to be Anna-Luise’s father, and it comforts him to think that ‘A father dies first’ 
(80). Thus, normal family relationships are displaced. Anna-Luise, like Sarah in The Human 
Factor, is passionately attached to her older husband. Having effectively repudiated her 
natural father, she clings to Jones as a surrogate, telling him: ‘You’re my lover and my father, 
my child and my mother, you’re the whole family – the only family I want’ (17). In trying to 
explain the nature of their unlikely relationship, Jones reaches the psychological insight that 
‘Perhaps she [Anna-Luise] was seeking a father more sympathetic than Doctor Fischer, just as 
I may have been engaged on a parallel pursuit, of a daughter rather than a wife’ (12). If Jones’ 
analysis here is correct, the marriage is not based on unselfish love that seeks to make the 
other person in the marriage happy, but rather on a selfish desire to make oneself happy by 
means of the other person. This may seem a harsh judgement, but it helps to explain the 
terrible emptiness that Jones experiences after Anna-Luise’s death. True love, as the Mayor in 
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Monsignor Quixote will discover, continues to grow after death, but selfish desire dies when 
there is no longer any chance of gratification. 
Doctor Fischer arrogantly tells his widowed son-in-law that ‘You are not a man of 
great intelligence, Jones, or you wouldn’t at your age be translating letters about chocolates 
for a living’ (106), whereas Castle is described as a ‘Dullish man, first-class, of course, with 
files’ (The Human Factor 32). It is typical of Greene to take an interest in the unsuccessful 
lives of ordinary people. It is also, in a way, easier to sympathize with such people than with 
the great and the brilliant. Yet The Human Factor and Doctor Fischer of Geneva illustrate 
that even in such ordinary, suburban environments as Berkhamsted and Vevey life is just as 
unpredictable as in The End of the Affair, which is set in the middle of the London blitz. 
Indeed, Jones himself at one point observes that it may be unhealthy to create an artificial, 
escapist world of one’s own that attempts to ignore the fluctuations and insecurities of life: 
‘Perhaps we had escaped a little too far into a world where only the two of us existed’ (68). 
The world that Jones creates for himself and Anna-Luise tries to ignore death: in 
particular he does not expect to outlive Anna-Luise. In general terms, it appears that death, 
during the past century, has increasingly come to be seen as unnatural and as something that 
may be eliminated, or at least postponed almost indefinitely, by medical and scientific 
advances; thus, at the hospital following Anna-Luise’s skiing accident, Jones notes that ‘The 
Swiss are very efficient. Think of the complex watches and precision instruments they make. 
I had the impression that Anna-Luise would be repaired as skilfully as they would repair a 
watch’ (92–93). Indeed, Jones admits that ‘Death was not a serious subject for either of us’ 
(66). Thus, when Jones is confronted with the unexpected death of Anna-Luise, the effect on 
him is understandably, yet predictably, devastating. This is not intended to suggest that the 
mind can – or ought to be – prepared for the sudden death of a young, healthy woman like 
Anna-Luise, which can only come as a great shock. Rather, Doctor Fischer of Geneva 
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illustrates the fundamentally unpredictable nature of life. Only death, the source of the tragic 
sense of life in Unamuno’s philosophy, is certain and inescapable, and therefore deserves to 
be taken seriously by those who would live their lives to the full. Anna-Luise, who has 
experienced in childhood the death of her mother, perhaps understands this better than most, 
but her voice is only indirectly and indistinctly heard through Jones’ narrative. 
Probably the most explicit point of contact between Doctor Fischer of Geneva and the 
philosophy of Unamuno is to be found in a remark made by Anna-Luise during Christmas 
midnight mass at the great Swiss Abbey of St Maurice: ‘I don’t believe in all this Christmas 
business, only I want to believe’ (81). This, of course, echoes the line in Browning’s ‘Bishop 
Blougram’s Apology’ where the bishop exclaims: ‘If you desire faith – then you’ve faith 
enough’ (634). Similarly, Unamuno insists that ‘To believe in God is, in the first place […], to 
wish for God to exist and to be unable to live without Him’ (4: 185). In wanting to believe, 
then, Anna-Luise is already a believer by Unamuno’s definition, even though she may not 
recognise herself as such. Nor does Jones, for when he buries her in the Anglican cemetery, 
he does so explicitly because ‘nobody so far as I know has established agnostic cemeteries’ 
and because ‘the Anglican Church, with all its contradictory beliefs, seemed closer to our 
agnostic views’ (97). Given Anna-Luise’s earlier remark, however, one hesitates to call Anna-
Luise a true agnostic. Instead, it seems that Jones is projecting his own agnosticism and even 
his lack of interest in religion onto his wife. Jones does not know ‘in what church Anna-Luise 
had been baptized – we had not had sufficient time together to learn such unimportant details 
about one another’ (97). This seems to be characteristic of Jones’ approach to religion, in the 
sense that whatever ‘half-belief’ (132) he has is private and non-denominational. 
Perhaps the most basic insight of Jones’ ‘half-belief’, however, is that ‘If you have a 
soul you can’t be satisfied’ (83). Suffering and unhappiness are signs of what Jones calls a 
developed soul. Complacency, or satisfaction with oneself, on the other hand, is a definite 
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sign of soullessness or an underdeveloped soul. This sense of dissatisfaction is the closest that 
Jones comes to articulating something of the tragic sense of life, which includes a realisation 
that the soul aspires to something more than the finite world can offer. 
It is the direct confrontation with the dead body of Doctor Fischer that leads Jones to 
conclude that physical death is the end of personal consciousness: ‘I looked at the body [of 
Doctor Fischer] and it had no more significance than a dead dog’ (141). After Anna-Luise has 
died, the doctor asks if Jones would ‘like to see her’ (95), but he refuses, and even wishes to 
finish all the paperwork at once to avoid having to return to the hospital the next day. Thus, 
Jones never confronts the death of his wife in the same physical way as he does that of his 
father-in-law. Instead, the image of Doctor Fischer lying dead in the snow comes to 
monopolize the representation of death in Jones’ eyes. Jones has been romanticising his image 
of Anna-Luise after her death; the dead Doctor Fischer shatters this image, leaving Jones 
feeling quite empty. 
The painting of the woman with the skull, which may be associated with Anna-Luise’s 
mother, is a romantic representation of death, the opposite of the prosaic image of the body of 
Doctor Fischer in the snow. Jones at first clings to the romantic representation, believing that 
his own death will somehow reunite him with Anna-Luise; the prosaic image, however, kills 
his dream of life after death: ‘Only if I had believed in a God could I have dreamt that the two 
of us would ever have that jour le plus long. It was as though my small half-belief had 
somehow shrivelled with the sight of Doctor Fischer’s body […]. There was no longer any 
reason to follow Anna-Luise if it was only into nothingness’ (142). This is perfectly in 
keeping with Unamuno’s notion that only God can guarantee personal immortality; without 
belief in God there is nothing. Yet there is an important difference between Jones and 
Unamuno. Like Castle, Jones does not believe in himself sufficiently to long for eternal life. 
Jones does not want immortality for himself, but only as a means of being reunited with 
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Anna-Luise. Unamuno, on the other hand, has a passionate belief in his own emphatic yo and 
an unconquerable desire for his own immortality. When reason tells him that there is no life 
after death, Unamuno rebels against reason to embrace faith. Jones, on the other hand, is not 
cut out for the role of the passionate rebel. His craving for a sense of security leaves no room 
for either doubt or faith. 
Just as normal family relationships are displaced when Jones becomes Anna-Luise’s 
‘lover and […] father’ (17), religion is also displaced as Doctor Fischer is compared in Jones’ 
mind ‘with Jehovah and Satan’ (141). The comparison starts out as a joke about Anna-Luise’s 
fears of her father’s power and influence: ‘You make him sound like Our Father in Heaven – 
his will be done on earth as it is in Heaven’. Anna-Luise confirms this impression: ‘That about 
describes him’ (24). Hints and rumours about his father-in-law raise Jones’ expectations to the 
point that when he actually meets Doctor Fischer, he is ‘surprised to see a man much like 
other men’ (27). When Jones at first does not receive an invitation to one of Doctor Fischer’s 
notorious dinner parties, Anna-Luise exclaims: ‘Thank God for that.’ Jones jokingly corrects 
her: ‘Thank Doctor Fischer, […] or is it the same thing?’ (29). Steiner, whose life has been 
ruined by Doctor Fischer because of his friendship with Anna-Luise’s mother, feels the same 
way: ‘he [Doctor Fischer] was a bit like God Almighty […]. Now I want to get near enough to 
him to spit in God Almighty’s face […]. It’s never too late to spit at God Almighty. He lasts 
for ever and ever, amen. And he made us what we are’ (137). At the same time, Doctor 
Fischer is compared with Satan: he is said to have ‘a devilish dignity’ (63) and an ‘infernal 
pride’ (39). According to Anna-Luise, he is more than dangerous: ‘He’s hell’ (18). At times 
the comparison becomes both melodramatic and somewhat strained, such as when Anna-
Luise accuses Jones: 
‘So you’ll let him [Doctor Fischer] take you into a high place and show you all the 
kingdoms of the world.’ 
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‘I’m not Christ, and he’s not Satan, and I thought we’d agreed he was God Almighty, 
although I suppose to the damned God Almighty looks very like Satan.’ 
‘Oh, all right,’ she said, ‘go and be damned.’ (33) 
It may be pointed out that Anna-Luise’s reference to Jesus being tempted in the desert (Matt. 
4.8; Luke 4.5) shows her to be quite familiar with at least some elements of Christianity. Yet 
Jones never inquires more deeply in to the particulars of her beliefs. 
It should be impossible to confuse or compare Doctor Fischer with God. Initially what 
is meant is merely to indicate that Doctor Fischer is very powerful, but increasingly the 
comparison takes on a life and logic of its own, until only his death can finally disprove it. 
That the comparison is possible at all, however, is an indication of a kind of power vacuum: 
as belief in God declines, powerful men and aptly named ‘idols’ are worshipped instead. 
Doctor Fischer, however, neither sees himself as a God nor believes in one, but cynically 
admits to finding ‘theology an amusing intellectual game’ (61). Doctor Fischer toys with the 
idea of a God made in his own image, greedy for the humiliation of his creatures – a 
bottomless, inexhaustible greed. Such a God would, he feels, provide an explanation for the 
humiliations that human beings suffer: ‘A cancer of the rectum, a streaming cold, 
incontinence’ (62). The idea has also occurred to Unamuno, who, in one of his darker 
fantasies, writes: ‘Still, from a religious point of view and within the domain of mystery, why 
should there not be an eternity of suffering – even though the idea violates our sentiments? 
Why should there not be a God who battens on our sufferings? Is our happiness, perchance, 
the end-purpose of the Universe?’ (4: 268). The vision of ‘a God who battens on our 
sufferings’ is truly horrifying, and one that cannot easily be dismissed or exorcised. Yet surely 
the question posed by Unamuno and repeated by Doctor Fischer is fundamentally irrational, 
and can thus only be answered by irrational faith in an irrational God? This, indeed, is the 
larger question that will also confront the Mayor and Father Quixote, the two main characters 
in Monsignor Quixote. 
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Doctor Fischer’s notorious parties – including the Porridge Party and the Bomb Party 
– take place within this context of a world without God, where there is ample room for the 
toothpaste millionaire to play Caesar to his guests, in the words of the novel’s epigram from 
Herman Melville: ‘Who has but once dined his friends, has tasted whatever it is to be Caesar’ 
(7). Doctor Fischer’s legendary wealth gives him the power to humiliate and tyrannise his 
invited guests while they perversely praise his ‘generosity’ (115) and his ‘great sense of 
humour’ (22), hoping to receive expensive gifts at the end of each party. The fact that all the 
guests – except Jones – are rich makes them no less eager to win their prizes. Doctor Fischer 
claims to be ‘studying the greediness of the rich’ (58–59), but actually his parties are a study 
in tyranny, and exposes the psychology of victims and tyrant. Doctor Fischer makes this quite 
explicit when he gives it as his opinion that one of the guests, ‘Mr Kips, like Herr Krupp, 
would have sat down happily to eat with Hitler in expectation of favours, whatever was 
placed before him’ (61). The workings of tyranny, it is suggested, are the same everywhere: 
the fact that Doctor Fischer operates on a much smaller scale than Hitler only makes the 
methods that are used more immediately apparent. Hitler, too, started his career as a dictator 
by dominating a few men, before gradually extending his sway through another kind of party. 
Apart from their ‘expectation of favours’, Doctor Fischer’s guests are flattered by the 
exclusivity of his parties. They see themselves as ‘a select group’ (11) and ‘a kind of club’ 
(54). Such exclusivity makes membership of the group seem desirable and valuable. The 
intrusion of an outsider such as Jones is resented. The suggestion that Jones’ presence should 
have been put to a vote among the members of the ‘club’ is, however, brutally quashed by 
Doctor Fischer, who asserts his power to humiliate and ridicule his guests (54–55). This is 
meekly accepted; furthermore, Doctor Fischer’s behaviour is consistently explained away as 
harmless good fun. Jones’ intrusion into the group as an ‘unfriendly audience’ (63) may be an 
added humiliation to the guests, but by his lack of cooperation and by refusing to laugh at the 
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‘Toads’, as Anna-Luise calls her father’s guests, Jones also poses a danger to Doctor Fischer 
himself, though the latter claims to despise the whole world and to care nothing about 
anyone’s opinion of himself. Yet by attempting to humiliate others, Doctor Fischer only really 
succeeds in humiliating himself, turning himself into a monster. In the end, by some 
numinous inspiration, Jones hits upon Doctor Fischer’s only vulnerable spot: ‘“How you must 
despise yourself,” I said to Doctor Fischer. I don’t know what made me say those words. It 
was as though they had been whispered in my ear’ (134). For the first time Doctor Fischer is 
asking the questions, not answering them: ‘What do you mean, Jones?’ (134) – and is ignored. 
Having discovered no end to ‘the greediness of the rich’ (58–59), and beginning to see that he 
has thoroughly humiliated himself in the process, Doctor Fischer goes away and kills himself. 
Jones, then, has proved himself an ‘unfriendly audience’ not just to the Toads, but to Doctor 
Fischer as well. This shows in some detail how Doctor Fischer’s tyranny over others works. 
At the same time, it reveals the fundamental weakness of that tyranny. Tyranny uses deceit 
and illusion to build up a psychological domination over others; once the illusion is shattered, 
the domination fails. Such a malign, tyrannical domination is very different from Unamuno’s 
ideal, which is to freely give oneself to others and to make oneself ‘eternal through them 
insofar as possible’ (4: 291). Seen in this way, Doctor Fischer is the direct opposite of Father 
Quixote. The best indication of this is that Doctor Fischer leaves behind him only emptiness, 
whereas Father Quixote leaves behind him a legacy of growing hope and love, as will be seen 
in the next chapter. 
The extent of Doctor Fischer’s corruption and corrupting influence can be seen in his 
manservant, Albert, who is both ‘insolent’ (26) and cringing with fear of his employer. Indeed, 
all the earlier servants left after Anna-Luise’s mother died, so that Albert, a more recent 
employee, is entirely Doctor Fischer’s creature. It is characteristic of Albert as of other 
victims of tyranny that he is incapable of exercising independent judgment, for fear of the 
 54 
consequences should he inadvertently make a mistake. Doctor Fischer may think that this 
conveys his power, but in fact his servant’s behaviour reflects very badly on himself. Anna-
Luise perceptively points out that ‘when a man tries to humiliate a waiter – he only humiliates 
himself’ (48) by his misuse of power. Immediately after Anna-Luise’s skiing accident, Jones 
himself actually feels the impulse, despite Anna-Luise’s earlier warning, to humiliate an 
unpleasant waiter: ‘I felt ashamed. But if it had been in my power I would have revenged 
myself for what had happened on all the world – like Doctor Fischer, I thought, just like 
Doctor Fischer’ (91). Fortunately, Jones is saved by his relative powerlessness and 
unimportance from becoming like Doctor Fischer. 
For a short time Jones appears to have been happy with Anna-Luise, but after her 
death he can only compare it to an uncharted island in the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean 
whose existence is perhaps no more than a rumour, even though ‘no navigator can be quite 
certain that it only existed in the imagination of some long-dead lookout’ (44). The island of 
happiness is irretrievably lost, and Jones starts to doubt if it ever existed, since happiness 
seems to defy rational explanation. He keeps telling himself how happy he was with Anna-
Luise, but cannot explain why. Unlike the causes of unhappiness, the causes of happiness are 
not so easily identified, and by trying to define them Jones is killing even the memory of his 
happiness. 
While it does not end happily, Doctor Fischer of Geneva does, however, end on a 
certain note of dignity. Despite being inadequately prepared both intellectually and spiritually, 
Jones has faced Doctor Fischer and survived the encounter with his dignity largely intact. If 
there is an answer to the terrible nightmare of a God who battens on human misfortune, then 
Doctor Fischer’s death provides it. Such a God would be unworthy of love or worship, and 
would be liable to end up like Doctor Fischer, despising himself and committing suicide. 
Indeed, Doctor Fischer embodies the perverse notion of a deity who only operates through 
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punishment and reward, like a police state. As soon as Doctor Fischer is dead, however, he 
and the false notion of a God created in his image cease to be important: ‘Our enemy is dead 
and our hate has died with him’ (143). No one fears a dead enemy; on the contrary one feels 
shame at having been deadly afraid of another mortal human being. But unlike hate, which 
dies with one’s enemy, love does not have to end with death, as Greene’s next book, 
Monsignor Quixote, will suggest. 
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Chapter Four: The Tragicomic Region of La Mancha 
1. 
Graham Greene’s Monsignor Quixote (1982) is a thoroughly delightful and readable novel, as 
well as an extremely interesting one from a philosophical and theological point of view. Here, 
one feels, it all comes together at last: Greene’s travels, his lifetime of reading and thinking 
about theology, philosophy, and literature, and voices from his own earlier fiction. It is not 
Greene’s last novel, but it is his most serene, in startling contrast to its two immediate 
predecessors, The Human Factor and Doctor Fischer of Geneva. As if to underline the change, 
even the climate is different: the bright and sunny uplands of La Mancha are far removed 
from both the physical decay of Greene’s tropical settings and the spiritual coldness of his 
earlier European settings. 
This thesis has suggested that The Human Factor (1978) and Doctor Fischer of 
Geneva (1980) implicitly take part in a dialogue with the philosophical writings of Unamuno, 
and particularly with The Tragic Sense of Life. In Monsignor Quixote, as will be seen, this 
dialogue is made explicit, and is broadened to include elements of Unamuno’s reading of 
Cervantes’ Don Quixote. As in its great literary ancestor, the two key literary devices in 
Monsignor Quixote are travel and dialogue. On their journeys the two main characters in the 
novel are able to pursue a dialogue freely, and this dialogue provides the perfect opportunity 
for philosophical and theological inquiry. 
Again like Don Quixote, Greene’s novel is divided into two parts. While the two 
books of Cervantes’ work were published separately in 1605 and 1615, Monsignor Quixote 
was published in its entirety in 1982 by Greene’s usual publisher, The Bodley Head. The first 
two chapters of the novel, entitled ‘How Father Quixote became a Monsignor’ and ‘How 
Monsignor Quixote set off on his travels’, however, had already been published separately as 
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Christmas reading in the Catholic weekly The Tablet in 1978 and 1980 respectively, and a 
further episode entitled ‘A visit from the Bishop’ had similarly been published in The Tablet 
in December 1981 (Holderness 280). This means that the publication of parts of Monsignor 
Quixote was parallel to the publication of The Human Factor and Doctor Fischer of Geneva. 
Such details may appear trivial, but it does seem quite significant that here, at the same time 
and in three very different works, Catholicism, which in the view of most critics (cf. 
Holderness 259; Sharrock 126) had been absent from Greene’s fiction since the publication of 
The End of the Affair (1951), is more explicitly reasserting itself. 
Valuable insights into the sometimes difficult making of Monsignor Quixote are 
provided by Greene’s friend and travelling companion, Father Leopoldo Durán, a Spanish 
priest and professor of literature. In his largely anecdotal book Graham Greene: Friend and 
Brother (1994), Father Durán records memories of the two men’s developing friendship and 
their annual travels by car through Spain in the 1970s and 1980s. Many of their conversations 
and experiences found their way into Monsignor Quixote, but were always altered in some 
way or another. Thus, Father Durán cannot be identified with Father Quixote any more than 
Greene himself can be identified with the Mayor, or with any other character in the novel, but 
elements of both Greene’s and Father Durán’s personalities clearly assert themselves 
throughout the novel. 
This chapter will start with a discussion of Monsignor Quixote’s relationship with 
Cervantes’ Don Quixote and the question of the nature of fact and fiction, which features 
prominently in Greene’s novel. From this the discussion will move to the notion of dialogue 
and its place in both Monsignor Quixote and some of Greene’s earlier fiction, particularly 
Travels with My Aunt and The Power and the Glory. Dialogue, however, requires intellectual 
content, and so the chapter will go on to discuss some elements of the relationship between 
Monsignor Quixote and Unamuno’s philosophy. Finally, as both Greene and Unamuno are 
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deeply concerned with Catholicism, it is necessary to identify the religious and sacramental 
framework of Monsignor Quixote, and to consider what impact this has on the character of 
Sancho, who represents atheist Marxism in the novel. 
2. 
Father Quixote may be only the humble pastor of the insignificant parish of El Toboso in La 
Mancha, but he is also a proud descendant of Don Quixote. For instance, he drives a small 
Seat 600 which he calls affectionately ‘in memory of his ancestor “my Rocinante”’ (11). The 
local bishop, however, is dismissive of Father Quixote’s ‘distinguished ancestry’, for ‘How 
can he be descended from a fictional character?’ (12). There is a certain irony in this question 
coming from one who is himself a fictional character, and it highlights the problem of 
distinguishing between fact and fiction, which is very much a central concern of the novel. 
An unexpected guest, the Bishop of Motopo, sets Father Quixote off on his travels by 
means of the ambiguous gift of having him elevated to the purely honorary rank of monsignor. 
Father Quixote’s elevation has the same function as Don Quixote receiving the honour of 
knighthood, and the circumstances are similarly ludicrous. But while Don Quixote eagerly 
sought the adventures and dangers of knight-errantry, Father Quixote at first seems quite 
reluctant to accept the role of ‘priest errant’ (85). Yet the journey that is set before him is 
shown by the Bishop of Motopo to be a necessary quest for truth, for ‘It was only by tilting at 
windmills that Don Quixote found the truth on his deathbed’ (24). 
Graham Holderness sees the Bishop of Motopo as a manifestation of ‘the stranger who 
rewards hospitality with a gift […] that is potentially capable of both good and harm’ (278). 
Indeed, the local bishop uses Father Quixote’s promotion as a pretext for driving him away 
from El Toboso, just as the Bishop of Motopo seems to have intended: ‘A man of your ability 
is wasted in El Toboso’ (23). While the local bishop sees Father Quixote as an intolerable 
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nuisance, the Bishop of Motopo believes there is more to this humble country priest than 
meets the eye, and that he needs greater scope to make use of his talents. 
The Bishop of Motopo’s power of discernment clearly stems from his understanding 
of Cervantes’ Don Quixote. Unamuno observes in his essay ‘On the Reading and 
Interpretation of Don Quixote’ that ‘Spain remains one of the nations where the book is least 
read; moreover, it is without a doubt the country where it is worst read. I am sick and tired of 
listening to Spaniards who have not been able to read through our book, the book which 
should be a sort of national Bible’ (3: 445). Indeed, while the visiting Italian bishop shows 
both appreciation for and understanding of this ‘national Bible’, the local Spanish bishop has 
‘never got beyond the first chapter’ (13). By contrast, Father Quixote finds the Bishop of 
Motopo ‘smiling over a page as his own bishop would certainly not have done’, and insisting 
that Cervantes was truly ‘a moral writer’ (22). And while the Spanish bishop prosaically 
argues that Don Quixote ‘was a fiction […] in the mind of a writer’, the Italian bishop 
paradoxically suggests that ‘Perhaps we are all fictions […] in the mind of God’ (24). The 
Bishop of Motopo appreciates not only literature but also the nature of faith. This is 
demonstrated by his rhetorical question, ‘Where would our faith be if there were no 
mysteries?’ (20), which is practically a paraphrase of Unamuno’s ‘How, without this 
uncertainty, could we ever live? (4: 131). Possibly this suggests a link between literature and 
faith, but the Bishop of Motopo is careful to distinguish between the two, commenting 
laconically about his Spanish brother in the episcopate: ‘Holiness and literary appreciation 
don’t always go together’ (15). 
Some critics have commented on the highly ‘artificial’ (Hoskins 262) or ‘fictive’ 
(Holderness 277) form of Greene’s later work, including Monsignor Quixote. From being 
fictions in the mind of the author, characters in a novel subsequently become fictions in the 
mind of the reader. Indeed, as the characters take hold of the reader’s imagination he or she 
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will begin to regard them as increasingly real and may, in the case of Monsignor Quixote, be 
drawn into their debate about fact and fiction. The reader, then, is brought into the region of 
ontological ambiguity and speculation that appealed so much to Unamuno, who in his essay 
‘Saint Quixote of La Mancha’ confesses his belief ‘that Don Quixote and Sancho have more 
historical reality than Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra, and more than the author of these lines, 
and that far from Cervantes being their creator, it is they who created Cervantes’ (3: 430). 
Whereas Cervantes is dead and buried, Don Quixote and Sancho live on in the minds and 
imaginations of countless readers, and it is because of them and through them that Cervantes 
too is remembered. Unamuno therefore playfully argues that Don Quixote – being in his 
opinion an historical person – should be canonised a saint by the Roman Catholic Church, an 
opinion which is implicitly endorsed by Father Quixote when he says that ‘I shall pray to my 
ancestor’ (202) for the alleged bank robber who causes Sancho and himself so much trouble. 
Throughout Monsignor Quixote the distinction between fact and fiction is continually 
being blurred, in keeping with Unamuno’s ideas. Sancho reminds Father Quixote: ‘You know 
how he [Unamuno] loved your ancestor and studied his life. If he had lived in those days 
perhaps he would have followed the Don on the mule called Dapple instead of Sancho’ (111). 
Here the Mayor, the priest, Unamuno, and Don Quixote are all presented as existing on the 
same level: they live in the reader’s imagination. Yet it has already been pointed out that 
Unamuno considered Don Quixote to have more historical reality than both himself and 
Cervantes; this is because Don Quixote is actually more alive and present in the minds of 
more people than either the author or the philosopher. 
The adventures of Don Quixote are an important source for events in Monsignor 
Quixote. Much of the dialogue in the novel is prompted by the sights and sounds and events 
of the journey itself, as the characters let their minds roam rather freely from the material to 
the abstract and back again. For instance, the car Rocinante nearly bumping into a sheep 
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brings to mind the great battle where Don Quixote mistakes two flocks of sheep for opposing 
armies and joins the fray on the side he deems more worthy of his support. And just as Don 
Quixote obstinately will mistake a country inn for a castle, and the vulgar women at the door 
for high-born ladies, so Father Quixote at first believes that the brothel to which Sancho takes 
him is a particularly friendly family hotel. Also, Father Quixote himself compares the episode 
with the alleged bank robber to the scene in which his ancestor releases the galley slaves 
(146–7), and while Don Quixote and Sancho are pursued by the Holy Brotherhood, Father 
Quixote and the Mayor are pursued by the Guardia Civil. 
From all this it emerges that Cervantes’ Don Quixote is the acknowledged literary 
ancestor of Greene’s Monsignor Quixote. Furthermore, it is becoming clear that Greene is 
reading Don Quixote very much in light of Unamuno’s thoughts about Cervantes’ work and 
the central importance of Don Quixote as Spain’s great and misread book. 
3. 
In Monsignor Quixote Greene follows the example of Cervantes in making use of a series of 
comic episodes that are bound together by the continuously evolving dialogue between the 
priest and Sancho as they travel through the Spanish countryside. Thus Greene avoids, in 
Sharrock’s words, ‘the risk of complete disintegration as in the old romances of chivalry’ 
(261). Greene himself attributes his interest in Cervantes and the romance to an early reading 
of Unamuno’s Life of Don Quixote and Sancho, which made no immediate impression, but 
which would gradually lead him to the ‘tragicomic region of La Mancha’ (Ways of Escape 
259), especially in Travels with My Aunt and in Monsignor Quixote. 
Indeed, Travels with My Aunt may be seen as a preliminary essay in the genre of the 
romance, and a precursor to Monsignor Quixote. Both novels are characterised by the dialogic 
and episodic form of the chivalric romance. Furthermore, in Travels with My Aunt Greene 
introduces elements that will be more fully developed in Monsignor Quixote. In particular, 
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Unamuno’s paradoxical belief in the ‘historical reality’ of Don Quixote and Sancho, which 
has already been noted, is voiced in this passage from Travels with My Aunt: 
Without breaking the silence I took a reverent glass of Chambertin to Uncle Jo’s memory, whether 
he existed or not. The unaccustomed wine sang irresponsibly in my head. What did the truth 
matter? All characters once dead, if they continue to exist in memory at all, tend to become fictions. 
Hamlet is no less real now than Winston Churchill, and Jo Pulling no less historical than Don 
Quixote. (62) 
In this passage fact and fiction again playfully merge. As the protagonist, Henry Pulling, 
during his travels with his Aunt Augusta, feels himself ‘being dragged at her heels on an 
absurd knight-errantry, like Sancho Panza at the heels of Don Quixote, but in the cause of 
what she called fun instead of chivalry’ (86), neither the protagonist nor the reader can be 
quite sure what the truth is in Aunt Augusta’s extravagant universe. Indeed, the many stories 
that Aunt Augusta tells in the novel constitute an extra level of fiction within the fiction. 
In particular, there are two episodes in Travels with My Aunt that reappear in a 
different form in Monsignor Quixote. The first concerns the colour purple as a mark of rank in 
the Roman Catholic Church. Aunt Augusta tells the story of a minor Italian war criminal, a 
Mr Visconti, who escapes disguised as a monsignor. The name recalls Gian Galeazzo 
Visconti, the protagonist of Marjorie Bowen’s novel The Viper of Milan, which made such a 
lasting impression on Greene as a teenager. The scene where Mr Visconti visits a clerical 
store in Rome, paying ‘a fortune to be fitted out as a monsignor even to the purple socks’ 
(118), prefigures Father Quixote’s visit, at Sancho’s insistence, to an exclusive ecclesiastical 
tailor’s shop in Madrid to buy purple socks befitting his new rank. Both stories gently mock 
the absurdity of purple socks, yet these form part of a uniform, as the Mayor points out: ‘Your 
ancestor had a proper respect for the uniform of a knight errant, even though he had to put up 
with a barber’s basin for a helmet. You are a monsignor errant and must wear purple socks’ 
(43). Indeed, when Father Quixote is about to confront a commercialised religious procession 
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which he sees as an ‘insult to Our Lady’ (227), he puts on his purple bib or pechera: ‘We are 
going into battle, Sancho, I need my armour. Even if it is as absurd as Mambrino’s helmet’ 
(225). Thus, a monsignor’s clerical garb is transformed into an important link between Father 
Quixote and his ancestor. Just as Don Quixote becomes a knight by putting on his armour, 
Father Quixote becomes a monsignor by wearing purple. In fiction, at least, clothes make the 
man. More to the point, Greene’s novel recognises the Catholic distinction between the person 
and the office, which means that the office may be validly performed even if the holder is 
unworthy. This, however, does not prevent Father Quixote from momentarily feeling ‘like an 
actor who is watched by friends in his dressing-room’ before ‘going into battle’ (225). 
The second episode concerns the practice of sacramental confession. Aunt Augusta 
tells the amusing story of how Mr Visconti has to pretend to hear the confession of a 
prostitute, characteristically ‘enjoying the chance he had of learning a thing or two, even 
though his life was in danger’ (120). Father Quixote, on the other hand, is accosted by a 
distraught undertaker who has stolen a set of brass handles from a priest’s coffin. Father 
Quixote is quite perplexed by the undertaker’s curious confession and ends up feeling himself 
something of a failure: ‘He thought: I didn’t say the right words. Why do I never find the right 
words? The man needed help and I recited a formula’ (134). The undertaker’s predicament is 
quite amusing, but Father Quixote’s frustration at his own inadequacy is a serious matter, and 
it does perhaps put the ill-tempered priest who refuses to hear Castle’s confession in The 
Human Factor in a new perspective. 
The dialogue and growing friendship between Father Quixote and Sancho are also 
central elements in Monsignor Quixote; a dialogue in which the priest clearly represents 
Catholicism, while the Mayor represents communism. This continues and develops a theme 
which Greene introduced as early as in The Power and the Glory (1940), where there is a 
tentative discussion between the captured ‘whisky priest’ and his captor, the lieutenant of 
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police. Though not explicitly a Marxist, the Mexican lieutenant of police is certainly both a 
materialist and a militant atheist. Following the lieutenant’s capture of the ‘whisky priest’ and 
during their journey to the state capital where the priest is to be executed, the two men are 
able to engage in a somewhat strained dialogue. While the lieutenant insists that ‘Nothing you 
say will make any difference’ (193), it becomes clear that he is subtly affected by the 
conversation, grudgingly admitting that the priest is not ‘a bad fellow’ (201). The lieutenant 
justifies the dialogue to himself and the priest by conventional stereotypes such as ‘It’s just as 
well. To know an enemy, I mean’ (196), and ‘I am not afraid […] of other people’s ideas’ 
(197). The priest, on the other hand, keeps repeating, rather nervously, that the lieutenant is 
really ‘a good man’ (193; 206). 
The dialogue in The Power and the Glory, however, is severely hampered by the 
priest’s fear, his hands shaking at the thought of his impending execution, and by the 
lieutenant’s distrust: ‘Sometimes I feel you’re just trying to talk me round’ (206). Despite this, 
the lieutenant briefly abandons his high principles and actually breaks the law by bringing the 
incarcerated priest a small flask of brandy the night before the execution. Under such 
circumstances the dialogue must necessarily be superficial, touching only very briefly on the 
nature of suffering and the appropriate response to human misery and unhappiness. Though 
the priest pathetically claims that ‘We agree about a lot of things’ (194), it is clear that the 
anticlerical climate of this damp and decaying southern Mexican state in the 1930s – 
modelled on the state of Tabasco – is not conducive either to real dialogue or real agreement. 
Dialogue is made possible by two people showing consideration for each other’s 
feelings. Father Quixote’s relations with his own bishop and with his replacement, Father 
Herrera, represent the antithesis of dialogue, whereas his encounter with the Bishop of 
Motopo is the prototype of a free and respectful dialogue. Similarly, the beginning of 
friendship is based on ‘the equality of a common interest’ and the ability to be ‘tactful with 
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each other’ (26). Indeed, ‘Father Quixote enjoyed the Mayor’s company for a street-corner 
chat more than that of his parishioners’ (25), and the latter, significantly, is the only other 
person in El Toboso who has read Don Quixote (15). 
Dialogue and the episodic form of the romance clearly go very well together, as 
demonstrated by Travels with My Aunt and Monsignor Quixote. In both novels the dialogue is 
both comic and absurd. In Travels with My Aunt, on the one hand, there is an added element 
of tenderness as it gradually emerges that Aunt Augusta is Pulling’s mother, not his aunt as he 
had previously thought. On the other hand, the dialogue between Father Quixote and the 
Mayor is founded on mutual consideration which leads to an increasingly close friendship. 
Their dialogue is infused with an element of seriousness stemming from its political, 
philosophical, and theological content, which can be traced to both Unamuno and to The 
Power and the Glory. 
4. 
As they set out on their first journey, Sancho and Father Quixote have both been effectively 
freed from their official positions: the Mayor has lost the election, and Father Quixote has 
been replaced – albeit temporarily – by Father Herrera. On setting out on the second journey, 
Father Quixote has in addition been summarily and unjustly suspended by his bishop from 
celebrating the sacraments. Both men are therefore quite free to speak openly to each other 
about their beliefs, doubts, and hopes for the future, and the long periods they spend together 
in the car Rocinante, as well as the picnics and meals that punctuate their journey, provide the 
best possible setting for an extended dialogue. Two of the main subjects of this dialogue are 
the theological and philosophical concepts of apocatastasis and doubt, which will discussed 
and explained in some detail. 
Prompted by the incident with the sheep in the road, Father Quixote and Sancho start 
discussing Jesus’ parable of the sheep and the goats (Matt. 25.32–46), where the sheep on his 
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right hand are blessed and invited to ‘inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the 
foundation of the world’ (34), while the goats on the left are cursed and dismissed ‘into 
everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels’ (41). This discussion deeply affects 
Father Quixote, haunting him during his final moments at Osera: ‘He whispered so softly that 
only the Mayor caught his words, “Lamb of God, but the goats, the goats”’ (249). The parable 
of the sheep and the goats provides some of the foundation for the doctrine of heaven and hell, 
of eternal bliss for the saved and eternal punishment for the damned. But Unamuno complains 
that traditionally ‘hell has been conceived as a police institution, to inspire fear in this world’, 
observing that in this capacity hell has become ineffectual, since ‘it no longer frightens 
anyone, and therefore it will have to be closed down’ (4: 268). 
To the doctrine of heaven and hell Unamuno opposes the doctrine of apocatastasis or 
restitution, which Unamuno calls ‘a final triumph of the spirit’ (4: 262), and which allows one 
to hope ‘that all shall be saved, including Cain and Judas, and Satan himself, as Origen hoped’ 
(4: 266). Like the Alexandrine theologian Origen, the doctrine of apocatastasis has been 
highly controversial. Unamuno, however, links apocatastasis directly to the writings of Paul: 
‘And when all things shall be subdued unto him [Jesus], then shall the Son also himself be 
subject unto him that put all things under him, that God may be all in all’ (1 Cor. 15.28). 
Apocatastasis, to Unamuno, is ‘God’s coming to be all in all’ (4: 263), but in what 
way can God be said to be ‘all in all’ in the damned in hell? Indeed, Paul seems to suggest the 
possibility of a universal restitution or restoration, where ‘The last enemy that shall be 
destroyed is death’ (1 Cor. 15.26). Attempting to reconcile Jesus’ parable with Paul’s vision, 
Unamuno offers the possibility ‘that only those are saved who longed to be saved’ (4: 270) 
and that ‘perhaps the sin against the Holy Ghost, for which, according to the Gospel, there is 
no remission, is none other than that of not desiring God, that of not longing to be made 
eternal’ (4: 270–1). This, according to Unamuno, would be just, because ‘there is no injustice 
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in not giving a man something he does not know enough to desire’ (4: 270), but it is too 
isolated, too individualistic an approach. ‘No one’, Unamuno says, ‘who beholds his bother 
suffering in hell can rejoice in God, for the fault and the merit were common to both’, so that 
apocatastasis is the ‘grand dream of the final solidarity of mankind’ (4: 277). It is in this 
context of apocatastasis and human solidarity that the Catholic concepts of purgatory and the 
communion of saints find their place, with a ‘sense of the transmission of accumulated merits 
both to the living and to the dead’ (4: 272) through the offering of prayers of intercession. 
This, then, is the philosophical and religious setting for the discussion between the 
Father Quixote and Sancho about heaven, hell, and purgatory. Unreasonably dismissing 
purgatory as a ‘convenient invention’, the Mayor finds it more tempting to believe in hell than 
in heaven: ‘“I wish I believed in damnation,” the Mayor replied, “for I would certainly put 
him [Franco] – as I am sure Dante would have done – in the lowest depths”’ (57). Thus he is 
not unlike the Boy in Greene’s Brighton Rock (1938), who believes in Hell but not in Heaven: 
‘These atheists, they don’t know nothing. Of course there’s Hell. Flames and damnation, […] 
torments’ (52). Hell seems easier to imagine than heaven, perhaps because it appears to 
correspond more closely to actual human experience, as Mr Prewitt, the Boy’s solicitor, 
points out: ‘You know what Mephistopheles said to Faustus when he asked where Hell was? 
He said, “Why, this is Hell, nor are we out of it”’ (210). To Mephistopheles in Marlowe’s 
play Doctor Faustus (1604), the torments of hell are increased by his having previously 
known the bliss of heaven; to the Boy, hell is quite simply ‘the only thing that fits’ (52). The 
Mayor’s wish to believe in hell is motivated by hatred of an enemy, which really only proves 
Mephistopheles’ point. 
Father Quixote, on the other hand, not only suspects ‘human judgement, even Dante’s’ 
(57), but also finds it difficult to believe in hell at all, admitting that he has been asking 
himself ‘whether it is possible … how can a merciful and loving God …?’ (58). In sentiment, 
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then, Father Quixote approaches Unamuno, whom he only knows by reputation, more closely 
than does Sancho, who has studied under him. Father Quixote desires not only his own 
personal salvation, but the salvation of all. The Mayor has difficulty accepting or 
understanding that anyone would want to pray at the tomb of the dead dictator, Franco, but 
Father Quixote quietly asks: ‘Why not? Even if it was the tomb of Judas – or Stalin – I’d say a 
prayer’ (86). 
While Father Quixote has his doubts about Catholic theology, Sancho has his doubts 
about Marxist ideology. It is precisely a shared sense of doubt that unites the two men: ‘It’s 
odd, he [Father Quixote] thought, […] how sharing a sense of doubt can bring men together 
perhaps even more than sharing a faith. The believer will fight another believer over a shade 
of difference: the doubter fights only with himself’ (59). According to Greene, the feeling of 
doubt is crucial. After having completed Monsignor Quixote he found, somewhat to his own 
surprise, that as early as in 1964 he had written the following marginalia in his edition of the 
Carnets of Camus: ‘Perhaps the most important historical point in the future will be when the 
Christian says “I do not always believe” and the Marxist agrees with him.’ This, according to 
Greene, is ‘what Monsignor Quixote is all about’ (qtd in Couto 214). 
Greene’s emphasis on doubt harmonises well with Unamuno’s philosophy. It is 
therefore significant that following their visit to the tomb of Franco in the Valley of the Fallen, 
Sancho takes Father Quixote to Salamanca to visit the grave of Unamuno, who had been 
Sancho’s professor during his time as a student there. Unamuno was an enemy of both 
communism and Fascism, as Sancho acknowledges: ‘In a sense he was my enemy too for he 
kept me in the Church for several years with that half-belief of his which for a while I could 
share’ (111). This statement provokes ‘an unaccustomed anger’ (112) in Father Quixote, who 
mocks the Mayor: ‘And now you have complete belief, don’t you? In the prophet Marx. You 
don’t have to think for yourself any more’ (111). Father Quixote’s anger – ‘or was it, he 
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wondered, envy?’ (112) – represents his fear that without ‘sharing a sense of doubt’ (59) their 
friendship may be illusory. He is, however, reassured as Sancho questions himself: 
‘Have I complete belief?’ Sancho asked. ‘Sometimes I wonder. The ghost of my professor 
[Unamuno] haunts me. I dream I am sitting in his lecture room and he is reading to us from one of 
his own books. I hear him saying, “There is a muffled voice, a voice of uncertainty which whispers 
in the ears of the believer. Who knows? Without this uncertainty how could we live?”’ (112) 
Life without uncertainty, to Unamuno, is plainly unbearable, because with absolute certainty 
there can be no room for faith or hope. Sancho is synthesising the conclusion of a key passage 
from Unamuno’s major work, The Tragic Sense of Life. The whole paragraph may be worth 
quoting in extenso both to show Unamuno’s line of thought and his idiosyncratic style of 
writing, which at its best verges on poetry: 
The absolute certainty that death is a complete and definitive and irrevocable annihilation of 
personal consciousness, a certainty of the same order as our certainty that the three angles of a 
triangle are equal to two right angles, or, contrariwise, the absolute certainty that our personal 
consciousness continues beyond death in whatever condition (including in such a concept the 
strange and adventitious additional notion of eternal reward or punishment) – either of these 
certainties would make our life equally impossible. In the most secret recess of the spirit of the 
man who believes that death will put an end to his personal consciousness and even to his memory 
forever, in that inner recess, even without his knowing it perhaps, a shadow hovers, a vague 
shadow lurks, a shadow of the shadow of uncertainty, and while he tells himself: ‘There’s nothing 
for it but to live this passing life, for there is no other!’ at the same time he hears, in this most 
secret recess, his own doubt murmur: ‘Who knows? …’ He is not sure he hears aright, but he hears. 
Likewise, in some recess of the soul of the true believer who has faith in a future life, a muffled 
voice, the voice of uncertainty, murmurs in his spirit’s ear: ‘Who knows? …’ Perhaps these voices 
are no louder than the buzzing of mosquitoes when the wind roars through the trees in the woods; 
we scarcely make out the humming, and yet, mingled in the uproar of the storm, it can be heard. 
How, without this uncertainty, could we ever live? (4: 131) 
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A comparison between this passage and the Mayor’s condensed version makes it readily 
apparent how much Unamuno’s style of writing differs from Greene’s. Yet this is Unamuno’s 
way of relentlessly making his point, appealing as much to sentiment as to reason. Indeed, 
Unamuno’s style is perfectly appropriate, because words fall short when it comes to 
describing the invisible God. Unamuno’s question ‘Who knows?’ – ‘¿quién sabe?’ (4: 145) – 
is therefore all the more insidious for its apparent simplicity. He knows – and makes full use 
of – the impossibility of proving a negative. Science operates by advancing hypotheses that 
may be disproved, and on this basis scientific theories are built. It follows that, apart from 
pure mathematics, there are few or no real absolutes in science. There is apparently no 
scientific evidence that any part of a person’s individual consciousness survives death, but 
‘Who knows?’ The absence of evidence is no evidence. Consequently, the ¿quién sabe? of 
Unamuno seems to be permanently irrefutable. Yet this would only be so much sophistry if it 
were not for the desire that all human beings, according to Unamuno, feel for eternal life. 
While reason denies a person’s consciousness may survive his or her death, desire wills 
otherwise: ‘And from this clash, from this embrace between despair and scepticism, is born 
uncertainty, holy, sweet, saving uncertainty, our supreme consolation’ (4: 131). 
To Unamuno, the human condition is summed up by ‘those supremely meaningful, 
immortal words’ (4: 133) of the father of the possessed boy in the Gospel according to Mark: 
‘Lord, I believe; help thou mine unbelief’ (9.24): ‘Such is human faith; such was the heroic 
faith which Sancho Panza had in his master, the knight Don Quijote de la Mancha, as I think I 
have shown in my Life of Don Quixote and Sancho, a faith based on uncertainty, on doubt.’ 
And Unamuno goes on to state that ‘Don Quixote is the prototype of the vitalist whose faith is 
founded on uncertainty, and Sancho is the prototype of the rationalist who doubts his own 
reason’ (4: 133). Doubt and uncertainty, according to Unamuno’s interpretation, unite Sancho 
and Don Quixote, just as they unite Father Quixote and the Mayor, their literary descendants. 
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5. 
The sharing of a meal is the expression par excellence of human solidarity and unity. At the 
centre, therefore, both of the novel and of Father Quixote’s life, is the Eucharist, which is also 
the church’s great prayer of thanksgiving and of intercession wherein the merits of Jesus’ 
sacrifice on the cross are applied to the living and the dead. The elements of the Eucharist are 
those of any ordinary meal in the Mediterranean world: 
At the heart of the Eucharistic celebration are the bread and wine that, by the words of Christ and 
the invocation of the Holy Spirit, become Christ’s Body and Blood. […] The signs of bread and 
wine become, in a way surpassing understanding, the Body and Blood of Christ; they continue also 
to signify the goodness of creation. (Catechism 1333) 
Thus bread and wine provide the link between creation and redemption. The etymological 
origin of ‘Eucharist’ is the Greek word for ‘giving thanks’, and in the Eucharist the Church 
gives thanks for the gifts of the Creator and Redeemer. The Greek word for ‘sacrament’ is 
‘mystery’, and the richness of the Eucharistic mystery seems positively inexhaustible: ‘The 
Eucharist is the heart and summit of the Church’s life, for in it Christ associates his Church 
and all her members with his sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving offered once for all on the 
cross to his Father’ (Catechism 1407). 
Jesus affirms the importance of the Eucharist, linking it also to eternal life: ‘Whoso 
eateth my flesh, and drinketh my blood, hath eternal life; and I will raise him up at the last 
day’ (John 6.54). These words speak directly to the fundamental desire for immortality that 
Unamuno identifies in himself, and which he believes is a truly human desire. There are at 
least five important encounters or episodes that affirm the centrality of the Eucharist in 
Monsignor Quixote. These include Father Quixote’s encounter with the Bishop of Motopo, 
the picnics with Sancho, the suspension a divinis, Father Quixote and Sancho’s encounter 
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with Señor Diego, and the final mass at Osera. Of these, the last is the culmination, for which 
the first four carefully and gradually prepare the ground. 
Father Quixote’s encounter with the Bishop of Motopo in the opening chapter of the 
novel immediately draws attention to the symbolic importance of food and wine. 
Appropriately, Father Quixote is first seen on his way to the local collective to buy wine. 
Father Quixote apologetically explains that while it is ‘a good little local wine’, it is not an 
‘important’ one; the Bishop of Motopo, however, corrects him: ‘No wine can be regarded as 
unimportant […] since the marriage at Cana’ (14). At Cana, according to the New Testament, 
Jesus miraculously turns water into wine at the instigation of Mary, thus embarking on his 
public ministry. Furthermore, the miracle at Cana is seen as a prefiguration of the Last Supper 
where Jesus offers his disciples bread and wine as his own body and blood. 
Significantly, the encounter with the Bishop of Motopo culminates in a meal. Teresa, 
the practical-minded housekeeper, provides the Bishop and Father Quixote with a simple 
lunch consisting of horsemeat and some local cheese and wine, followed by cognac. In the 
end, Father Quixote is left quite dazzled by ‘the Italian bishop who had shown such kindness, 
such courtesy, such love of wine’, so that ‘it seemed to him that one of the pagan gods he had 
read about in his Latin studies had rested for an hour or two under his roof-tree’ (24–5). This, 
then, is clearly no ordinary encounter, and no ordinary meal. The reference to paganism 
serves as a reminder that the ritual meal by far antedates Christianity. At the same time, the 
reference to Cana clearly locates this meal within the context of the Christian Eucharist. 
Incidentally, the Bishop of Motopo’s love of wine and generally liberal attitude suggest that 
he is closely modelled on Browning’s Bishop Blougram. 
During their travels through La Mancha, in crisp air and sunshine, Father Quixote and 
the Mayor enjoy stopping off quiet country roads to have a picnic, typically in the shade of an 
ancient tree beside a little brook in which they can chill a few bottles of Manchegan wine. 
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These picnics very much resemble the ones that Greene himself enjoyed when travelling in 
Spain with his friend Father Leopoldo Durán, and they display a sense of peace and serenity 
that is new and a little surprising in Greene’s fiction. 
Roger Sharrock sees the picnic scenes ‘as a code for harmony and increasing 
friendship’, but also notes that they possess ‘a ritual aspect’: ‘The repeated scenes do not just 
operate as a useful shorthand within the convention of realism: by creating an atmosphere 
suggesting ritual celebration they seem to point outside the limits of realism’ (275). Sharrock 
does not mention the Eucharist, but arguably this is precisely the ‘ritual celebration’ to which 
the picnic scenes are pointing. This interpretation does not contradict, but rather supplements 
the idea that the picnic scenes demonstrate ‘harmony and increasing friendship’. In general, 
the sharing of ordinary food and drink tends to create and maintain a sense of community 
between people, and the Eucharist, in particular, creates and maintains bonds of communion 
between those who participate in its celebration. 
Because of the fundamental importance of the Eucharist in his life as a Catholic priest, 
it is with a sense of horror that Father Quixote later learns of his suspension a divinis, a 
metaphorical ‘sentence of death’ (207) which ‘means I mustn’t say Mass – not in public, not 
even in private. […] I remain a priest, but a priest only to myself. A useless priest forbidden to 
serve others’ (208). The local bishop considers Father Quixote’s behaviour to be unworthy of 
the clerical state; Father Quixote, however, believes himself innocent, and feels deprived of 
his very raison d’être. The painful scene confirms that the Eucharist is indeed at the heart of 
Father Quixote’s existence. In his final state of semi-delirium, Father Quixote’s conscience 
utterly rejects the bishop’s judgement: ‘You condemn me, Excellency, not to say my Mass 
even in private. This is a shameful thing. For I am innocent’ (247). 
In the next important scene, Father Quixote and the Mayor encounter Señor Diego, an 
‘old man with great dignity’ (217) who is the owner of a particularly fine vineyard. Seated 
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under a fig tree the three men converse about the disappearance of rural, non-industrial 
attitudes and values. ‘A vine’, to Señor Diego, ‘is alive like a flower or a bird. It is not 
something made by man – man can only help it to live – or to die’ (221). Father Durán 
explains that Señor Diego is based on a Señor Antonio who ‘like Señor Diego in the novel, is 
first and foremost a poet, a man whose heart overflows with humanity and poetry’ (322). 
Indeed, it is poetic language that gives human beings the imaginative power to see bread and 
wine as signs of a mystery or sacrament. The major significance of Señor Diego and his 
vineyard in the novel is therefore the organic connection between wine and the Eucharist: 
‘Thus in the Offertory we give thanks to the Creator for bread and wine, fruit of the “work of 
human hands”, but above all as “fruit of the earth” and “of the vine” – gifts of the Creator’ 
(Catechism 1333). Señor Diego represents all those whose work has gone into the making of 
wine for the Eucharist, and his attitude is truly one of acknowledging the vine as a gift of the 
Creator, ‘not something made by man’. 
The final and culminating event is Father Quixote’s last Mass at the monastery of 
Osera, where he is brought, dying, after a violent encounter with the Guardia Civil. Rising 
from his bed in the middle of the night, Father Quixote proceeds ‘slowly and carefully’ (247), 
either dreaming or delirious, to the monastery church, followed by the Mayor, Father 
Leopoldo the guestmaster, and a Professor Pilbeam, an expert on Ignatian spirituality. Having 
found his way to the church, Father Quixote walks ‘firmly’ straight to the altar and celebrates 
an ‘oddly truncated form’ of Mass: 
‘Who the day before He suffered took bread …’ Father Quixote seemed totally unaware 
that there was no Host, no paten waiting on the altar. He raised empty hands, ‘Hoc est enim corpus 
meum,’ and afterwards he went steadily on without hesitation to the consecration of the non-
existent wine in the non-existent chalice. 
Father Leopoldo and the professor had knelt from custom at the words of consecration: the 
Mayor remained standing. He wanted to be prepared if Father Quixote faltered. 
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‘Hic est enim calix sanguinis mei.’ The empty hands seemed to be fashioning a chalice out 
of the air. (248–9) 
Father Quixote is not dissuaded by the absence of the elements of bread and wine, taking 
Communion himself and urging the Mayor to receive it as well: ‘“Compañero,” the priest said, 
“you must kneel, compañero”’ (250). Thus the Mayor receives invisible Communion at the 
hands of Father Quixote: ‘Anything which will give him peace, he [the Mayor] thought, 
anything at all’ (250). The priest subsequently collapses and dies on the floor by the altar. 
This strange celebration of the Eucharist precipitates a debate between the Mayor, 
Professor Pilbeam, and Father Leopoldo about whether they have just been witnessing a true 
celebration of the Mass. It does, however, seem quite clear from the way the scene is 
described that this is indeed Father Quixote’s last celebration of the Eucharist, in defiance of 
the bishop’s unjust prohibition. The Eucharistic elements of bread and wine are not really 
missed, because this final Mass in a sense consecrates all the meals that Father Quixote and 
Sancho have already shared together on their two journeys. The picnic scenes thus anticipate 
the moment when Father Quixote gives Sancho invisible communion. Seen not as a sequence 
of events, but as one spiritual moment, resolving all distinction between fact and fiction, the 
novel is itself a literary celebration of the Eucharist. 
6. 
It is important that despite his suspension from sacramental ministry, Father Quixote remains 
a priest and he remains at the service of others until the end. Like his ancestor who offered 
Sancho the governorship of an island, Father Quixote, shortly before his death, in his turn 
offers the Mayor a kingdom: 
The voice that came from the bed however sounded strong and firm. ‘I don’t offer you a 
governorship, Sancho. I offer you a kingdom.’ 
‘Speak to him,’ Father Leopoldo urged. 
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‘A kingdom?’ Sancho repeated. 
‘Come with me, and you will find the kingdom.’ 
‘I will never leave you, father. We have been on the road together too long for that.’ (246) 
As a priest it is not for Father Quixote to offer anyone a kingdom of this world. What he has 
to offer the Mayor, on the contrary, is the kingdom of heaven, thus showing that even in his 
final dreamlike state he is aware of his priestly ministry. 
Sancho’s life is profoundly changed by his friendship with Father Quixote. Even 
though he and the other survivors must go on searching, one suspects that Father Quixote has 
finally found ‘truth’ on his deathbed, as the Bishop of Motopo hoped. For the Mayor, nothing 
can be quite the same again following his travels with Father Quixote, a man he had come to 
love and respect. Indeed, 
an idea quite strange to him had lodged in his brain. Why is it that the hate of man – even of a man 
like Franco – dies with his death, and yet love, the love which he had begun to feel for Father 
Quixote, seemed now to live and grow in spite of the final separation and the final silence – for 
how long, he wondered with a kind of fear, was it possible for that love of his to continue? And to 
what end? (256) 
Thus it appears that the Mayor’s hate of Franco – the hate which had led him to the perverse 
wish that hell might exist for the purpose of the Generalissimo’s punishment – is now 
resolved through the workings of his love of Father Quixote. For while Father Quixote has 
had the company of his ‘books of chivalry’ and his love of Jesus, Mary, and the saints, the 
Mayor seems to have been a very lonely man, even to the extent of depending on a brothel for 
human contact, and finding as he grows older that such comfort as can be found there is by its 
very nature transient. He is not intimate with his party comrades, being instead concerned to 
conceal from them his own nagging doubts about Marxism. It seems that Father Quixote is his 
only real friend, and he naturally wonders, and worries, where that friendship and that love 
will lead him. 
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Father Quixote’s death leaves the Mayor with both a sense of irreplaceable loss and 
unexpected hope. In his mind, at least, Father Quixote lives on indeed, in keeping with 
Unamuno’s suggestion that ‘We fight against death not only by longing for the irrational, but 
also by acting in such wise that we become irreplaceable, impressing our seal upon others, 
working upon our fellow men and dominating them, giving ourselves to them and making 
ourselves eternal through them insofar as possible’ (4: 291). 
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Conclusion 
This thesis has aimed to read Graham Greene’s three late novels The Human Factor (1978), 
Doctor Fischer of Geneva or the Bomb Party (1980), and Monsignor Quixote (1982) in the 
light of Unamuno’s philosophy of the tragic sense of life. This sense is well articulated by 
another Catholic writer, J. R. R. Tolkien, in his essay ‘Beowulf: The Monsters and the Critics’, 
where he says of the Geat hero that ‘He is a man, and that for him and many is sufficient 
tragedy’ (115). Greene’s characters, unlike Beowulf, do not fight physical monsters or a 
physical dragon; they confront instead the monsters of despair, doubt, hopelessness, and 
uncertainty. The challenge, according to Unamuno, is to face these theological monsters and 
not be overcome by them, and to make oneself immortal as far as possible by making a 
difference in the lives of other people. For instance, Castle’s wish ‘to right the balance’ (The 
Human Factor 147) may be interpreted as a vague desire to make a difference in this sense, 
but his efforts are negated by his own refusal ‘to go on for ever’ (24). Doctor Fischer, 
perversely, seeks to tyrannise the lives of others and thus only inspires hate, which dies with 
him. In the end it is Father Quixote who most closely approaches Unamuno’s ideal. The three 
novels can thus be seen as explorations of the Unamunian struggle for immortality. 
Looking back at the three novels, David Lodge’s earlier observation about the place of 
Catholicism in Greene’s fiction remains fundamentally valid: it does indeed provide ‘a system 
of concepts, a source of situations, and a reservoir of symbols with which he can order and 
dramatize certain intuitions about the nature of human experience’ (6). Yet it would be a 
serious mistake to see the religious symbols as entirely separate from their religious content. 
On the contrary, the assumption is that the ‘the nature of human experience’ is most 
accurately captured by the religious expression. Unamuno believes ‘that there exists no more 
solid foundation for morality than the foundation provided by the Catholic ethic’ (4: 288) 
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whose aim is eternal life with God. If human nature is created by God, then the human 
experience and the religious experience must correspond at some fundamental level. Thus, in 
each of the three novels, the religious life of the characters is important in some way. Castle in 
The Human Factor may have ‘left God behind in the school chapel’ (107), and Jones in 
Doctor Fischer of Geneva may feel that ‘the Anglican Church, with all its contradictory 
beliefs, seemed closer to our agnostic views’ (97), but neither character is allowed to ignore 
religion altogether. Indeed, in The Human Factor, an ingenious parallel is drawn between 
priestcraft and spycraft, between the secrecy of the confessional and the secrecy of Castle’s 
relationship with his KGB control, Boris. And Doctor Fischer’s studies of ‘the greediness of 
the rich’ (58–59) are given theological implications, as the toothpaste millionaire imagines a 
God in his own image, greedy for the humiliation of his creatures. Feeling revulsion for 
Doctor Fischer and incurable grief for the loss of his wife, Jones’ own ‘small half-belief’ 
(142) shrivels up and dies. These two novels thus successfully demonstrate both the difficulty 
of believing in God in an imperfect world and the terrible emptiness of ‘living and dying in 
this world without God’ (Lumen Gentium 16; qtd in Catechism 844). 
In Monsignor Quixote, Greene takes a step further to introduce a character, Father 
Quixote, who, despite his own doubts and misgivings, and despite the obvious shortcomings 
of the Roman Catholic Church, clings firmly to the faith, and by his modest, yet powerful 
example causes a fundamental change in the Mayor’s world-view. Jones asks why goodness 
should ‘have more immortality than evil?’ (The Human Factor 142); the Mayor asks why 
love seems to ‘live and grow in spite of the final separation and the final silence’ (Monsignor 
Quixote 256). The Mayor does not answer Jones’ question, but he testifies to his own 
experience of the immortality of love, which is a fundamental insight of Christian theology: 
‘And now abideth faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity’ (1 Cor. 
13.13). Whether they accept it or not, the environments in which the characters of all three 
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novels find themselves are permeated with Catholicism. In other words, Catholic faith and 
morals are as integral to Greene’s late fiction as they are to his earlier, so-called Catholic 
novels, such as Brighton Rock, The Power and the Glory, and The End of the Affair. But if 
Greene’s late fiction is Christian literature, then it is not the kind of literature Cardinal 
Newman may have had in mind when he warned about the impossibility of producing ‘sinless 
Literature of sinful man’ (195). None of Greene’s characters is flawless, model Christians; far 
from it. But the overall feeling that remains is that Greene’s fiction takes Catholicism 
seriously, frequently forcing the characters to grapple with serious questions of faith and 
morals: in this sense, at least, it can be called Christian literature. 
The Human Factor, Doctor Fischer of Geneva, and Monsignor Quixote are all 
enriched by references to Greene’s earlier novels. The three novels show that Greene can 
return to earlier genres and put them to new uses. Though formally a thriller, The Human 
Factor is a more serious and thoughtful work than Greene’s earlier works of the genre. Both 
The Human Factor and Doctor Fischer of Geneva are love stories, but even though they 
contain clear references to The End of the Affair, they are free of any kind of divine 
intervention or miracle, with the possible exception of Jones’ moment of inspiration when he 
finally discovers Doctor Fischer’s weak point: that the latter has come to despise himself as 
much as he does the whole world. And Monsignor Quixote continues the dialogue between 
Catholicism and communism that can be traced back to The Power and the Glory, within the 
new context of the romance which Greene had begun to explore with Travels with My Aunt.  
The Catholicism that is represented in Greene’s novels very much reflects the author. 
It is an intellectual and inquisitive form of Catholicism which is clearly unhappy with 
formulaic answers. For instance, the priest who rejects Castle is seen to be following the rules: 
he cannot hear Castle’s confession. Yet, paradoxically, the priest’s response is wrong: it 
would have been better if he could somehow have found a way to listen to Castle. And from 
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the perspective of the confessor, Father Quixote experiences the inadequacy of his own 
response to the undertaker’s problems. But with some help from Unamuno, at least Father 
Quixote and the Mayor come to see doubt can be a valuable and integral part of faith, rather 
than as something shameful that must be conquered or repressed. This, then, is something of 
the paradoxical nature of the religious universe of Greene’s fiction. 
Looking to the future, Mark Lawson is probably right to suggests that ‘With the 
intricacies of Catholic belief now more marginal even to some Catholics, these aspects of the 
stories will increasingly have to be taught and foot-noted as are the manners of society in Jane 
Austen’s day’ (4). Something else that would be most welcome is a new collection of essays 
on Greene’s fiction. This might include, inter alia, essays on theology and philosophy, 
Unamuno, the Second World War in Greene’s fiction, the relationship between literature and 
religion, Greene’s narrative style, his relationship with Evelyn Waugh and other Catholic 
writers, Greene’s influence on later fiction, Greene and film, to name but a few possible 
subjects, in no particular order. 
Given that many of Greene’s novels have colonial or post-colonial settings, post-
colonial theory may also prove a useful tool for the student of Greene’s fiction. A key issue 
might be whether Greene’s non-European settings merely provide a dramatic background for 
the spiritual struggles of the European characters, or whether Greene’s fiction has something 
to say about the use and abuse of colonial power, or about the relationships between the 
colonisers and the colonised. With an open mind there are many possibilities. Indeed, this 
thesis has argued that one of the chief characteristics of Greene’s late fiction is intellectual 
curiosity and dialogue; in this spirit it is to be hoped that in the future the study of his work 
will take many new and interesting forms. 
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